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ABSTRACT
When it comes to employee privacy rights in emerging
technologies, the times they are a-changin’. In the dawn of the
modern technological era, when electronic mail and the Internet
were in their relative infancy, the right to privacy meant almost
nothing in the workplace. Employers could promise that e-mail
would not be monitored, but then proceed to do so anyway.
When employees sued, seeking vindication of their perceived
privacy rights, courts cast aside any notion that an employee
could expect privacy in the workplace, and they did so almost
uniformly. The tide, however, appears to be turning. Judicial
decisions rendered in more recent years, coupled with
comparable statutory reform initiatives, suggest that as social
norms shift in light of the rapid development and
mainstreaming of modern technologies, the law is affording
protection to employees that previously did not exist. This
Article takes a retrospective-comparative approach to this
turning tide, delving deeply into the law of the early era of
modern technology and juxtaposing it against more recent
developments. The result is exposition of an unmistakable trend
favoring employee rights. This Article therefore tackles head-on
the ultra-modern legal problem of workplace privacy rights in
emerging technologies, but it does so in novel ways, as the first
to suggest that the trend is shifting toward greater recognition
of employee rights at the expense of employer prerogative.
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Come senators, congressmen
Please heed the call
Don’t stand in the doorway
Don’t block up the hall
For he that gets hurt
Will be he who has stalled
There’s a battle outside
And it is ragin’
It’ll soon shake your windows
And rattle your walls
For the times they are a-changin’.1
INTRODUCTION
The “ragin’ battle” in this case is not one that Bob Dylan
contemplated. Indeed, no one alive at the time he first swooned
those lyrics could have predicted the future that is now. The
“battle” involves the likes of iPhones and iPads, Blackberries
and laptops, Hotmail and Gmail, Facebook and Twitter—
technologies that could not even be fathomed fifty years ago,
but which are pervasive parts of the American economy today.2
Given their pervasiveness, it comes as no surprise that these
technologies permeate the workplace.3 This is both a blessing
1. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin’, on
A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1963), quoted in City of

THE TIMES THEY ARE
Ontario v. Quon, 560
U.S. 746, 768 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority opinion
for avoiding direct confrontation of the question of the Fourth Amendment’s
application to new workplace technologies, chastising, “[t]he-times-they-are-achangin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty”).
2. That such technologies are pervasive is indubitable. Nevertheless, a
multitude of statistics are available to support this assertion. For example, a
leading consumer research firm, The Nielsen Company, recently reported that
thirty-seven percent of all mobile customers in the United States have
smartphones (Blackberry, iPhone, etc.). Android Leads in U.S. Smartphone
Market Share and Data Usage, NIELSEN (May 31, 2011), http://
blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/android-leads-u-s-in-smartphonemarket-share-and-data-usage.html. Facebook reports that it has over 900
million users, over 700 million of whom are daily active users. See FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014);
cf. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 654 (N.J. 2010) (“In the
past twenty years, businesses and private citizens alike have embraced the
use of computers, electronic communication devices, the Internet, and email.”).
3. See Alison Diana, Workplace Social Network, Personal Device Use
(June
24,
2010,
11:54
AM),
Gaining,
INFORMATIONWEEK
www.informationweek.com/news/windows/microsoft_news/225701319
(discussing pervasive, and growing, use of social networking sites and
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and a curse. On one hand, employers reap a multitude of
benefits from employee use of technologies, including increased
productivity, efficiency, connectivity, and even morale, among
others.4 On the other hand, with workers instantly connected to
the outside world, employers risk disclosure of trade secrets
and confidential information.5 Employee online activities offer
a new frontier for workplace harassment, exposing employers
to liability in ways that are difficult to monitor and control.6
The lines separating an employee’s work from her life outside
the office are becoming ever more blurry, as she forges virtual
personal devices at work, and hypothesizing eventual demise of workplace
bans on such activity); Yammering Away at the Office: A Distraction or a
Bonus?, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2010), www.economist.com/node/15350928
(stating that with the advent of cloud computing and offerings from firms like
Apple, Facebook, and Google, consumers now have widespread access to
communications devices and web applications that they can use from the
workplace); see also Stengart, 990 A.2d at 655 (“In the modern workplace, for
example, occasional, personal use of the Internet is commonplace. Yet that
simple act can raise complex issues about an employer’s monitoring of the
workplace and an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
4. Cf. IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE & INTERNET LAW § 58.09[2] (Supp.
2013–14) (“Any policy should be drafted to be consistent with a company’s
corporate culture. Policies also should be written with an eye towards their
intended effect on employee morale.”); Ariel D. Cudkowicz et. al., Technology
and Privacy in the Workplace: Monitoring Employee Communications After the
Supreme Court’s Quon Decision, BOS. B.J., Fall 2010, at 29, 29 (“[E]mployees
are regularly encouraged or required to perform their job duties using
employer-provided technologies, such as computers, PDAs, and e-mail, and
employers often explicitly permit or tolerate limited use of workplace
resources to access personal e-mail accounts, commercial websites, and social
networking sites.”).
5. See, e.g., Sasqua Grp., Inc. v. Courtney, No. CV 10-528(ADS)(AKT),
2010 WL 3613855 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010) (discussing use by former employee
of information available on LinkedIn, Facebook, and Bloomberg to compile
customer information comparable to former employer customer database, and
concluding that ready availability of such information defeated trade secret
claim); Complaint at 10, TEKSystems, Inc. v. Hammermick, 2010 WL 1624258
(D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2010) (No. 0:10-CV-00819) (alleging that former employees
contacted former employer’s customers via LinkedIn in violation of nonsolicitation covenant in employment contract).
6. Cf. Yancy v. U.S. Airways, Inc., No. 10-983, 2011 WL 2945758, at *1
(E.D. La. July 20, 2011) (granting summary judgment in employee’s sexual
harassment suit based on Facebook posts by colleagues); Delfino v. Agilent
Techs., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (resolving negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims brought by victim of
threatening e-mails and web bulletin board postings against employer after
perpetrator used workplace computers); Tresa Baldas, ‘Textual Harassment’
on the Rise; Text Messages Can Prove to Be Potent Evidence in Bias Suits, 30
NAT’L L.J., no. 46, 2009, at 1, 1 (discussing a $450,000 settlement paid by
university after women’s athletic coach harassed female players with text
messages).
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connections with coworkers, supervisors, customers, and
vendors through social network sites like Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, and Pinterest, and she uses her employer-issued
laptop or smartphone to access her social networks, to check
her personal web-based e-mail, or to exchange personal text
messages, among other things.7
The rapid evolution of workplace technologies raises a
myriad of novel legal questions, and the law simply has not
kept pace in providing answers.8 Gone are the days when
employer monitoring could be accomplished only by observing
an employee’s conduct at work, listening to her telephone
conversations from across the room, or conducting a physical
search of her desk or office.9 Modern technologies permit
employers to access not only any e-mail messages an employee
sends or receives using her employer-provided account, but also
any websites she visits while on the employer’s network or
equipment, including personal web-based e-mail accounts.10
Further, with over 900 million people on Facebook,11 chances
are good that an employer can access a multitude of
information there or on other social network sites, whether
related to the company’s business or the employee’s work, or
not.12 Such a wealth of available information breeds ambiguity
7. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 654–55 (“In the past twenty years,
businesses and private citizens alike have embraced the use of computers,
electronic communication devices, the Internet, and e-mail. As those and other
forms of technology evolve, the line separating business from personal
activities can easily blur.”).
8. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2002) (describing federal statutes addressing privacy rights in electronic and
online information as “a complex, often convoluted, area of the law,” noting
that the statutes were enacted “prior to the advent of the Internet and the
World Wide Web,” and concluding that “the existing statutory framework is
ill-suited to address modern forms of communication”).
9. Cf. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 712–14 (1987) (assessing an
employer search of employee’s desk and office in light of privacy concerns
implicated by the Fourth Amendment); K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d
632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (evaluating invasion of privacy claim based on
employer search of employee’s workplace locker).
10. See Laura Petrecca, More Employers Use Tech to Track Workers, USA
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2010, 12:51 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
workplace/2010-03-17-workplaceprivacy15_CV_N.htm
(“Managers
use
technological advances to capture workers’ computer keystrokes, monitor the
websites they frequent, even track their whereabouts through GPS-enabled
cellphones.”).
11. FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, supra note 2.
12. Cf. Petrecca, supra note 10 (“Smarsh, one of many firms that offers
technology to monitor, archive and search employee communications on
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concerning the bounds of permissible employer access to, and
use of, such information, and beckons for legal answers.
The law is far from silent on the topic of workplace privacy.
The privacy rights of workers underlie lawsuits in the state
and federal courts with increasing frequency,13 while state
legislatures grapple with striking an appropriate balance
between employer prerogative and employee rights,14 and the
federal government considers various approaches it might
take.15 In addition, the debate surrounding workplace privacy
e-mail, IM, Twitter and text-messaging, services about 10,000 U.S.
workplaces.”).
13. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps.-IAM v. Vilsack, 681 F.3d 483, 499
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking down policy of random drug testing of Forest Service
Job Corps Center employees on grounds employer’s stated need for such
testing did not outweigh employees’ privacy interests); Doe v. Luzerne Cnty.,
660 F.3d 169, 175–78 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that female deputy sheriff’s
constitutional invasion of privacy claims were viable under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on video surveillance of flea
decontamination process, during which she was partially nude); Coughlin v.
Town of Arlington, No. 10-10203-MLW, 2011 WL 6370932, at *1–2 (D. Mass.
Dec. 19, 2011) (finding some privacy rights sufficient to support claims of
school teacher and principal against school district and certain of its
employees who accessed plaintiffs’ work and personal e-mail accounts and
disseminated messages therefrom in connection with investigation of alleged
improper sexual relationship); Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 186 (Iowa
2011) (adopting expansive view of tort of invasion of privacy under which
plaintiffs’ claims of video surveillance in workplace bathroom survived
summary judgment even though camera was inoperable at time of its
discovery, because employer’s electronic device “could have invaded privacy in
some way”).
14. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204.5 (2008) (providing for notice by
public employers of employee electronic monitoring); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-48d (West 2011) (mandating that employers provide prior written notice
of electronic monitoring by employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (2005)
(requiring employer notice to employees of electronic monitoring); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 10-7-512 (2012) (requiring same); Kathy Lundy Springuel, Maryland Is
First State to Restrict Employer Demands for Employee, Applicant Passwords,
Human Resources Rep. (BNA), at A-12 (May 7, 2012) (identifying Maryland as
first state to pass legislation restricting employer requests for employee and
applicable social network passwords and noting that several other states have
similar legislation pending).
15. E.g., Computer Matching and Privacy Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)
(2012) (specifying when disclosure of employee records may be allowed by
employers); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012)
(discussing the protection, obligations, disclosure, and enforcement of notpublic personal information); USA PATRIOT Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)
(discussing fraudulent and unauthorized access in connection with
computers); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2012) (discussing the different prohibited ramifications of intercepting and
disclosing wire, oral, or electronic communications); Stored Communications
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012) (discussing unlawful access to stored

2014]

EMPLOYEE PRIVACY IN THE TECH ERA

955

issues has garnered the attention of numerous legal scholars
who have published a plethora of books and articles exposing
the topic.16 Yet amidst all this banter, no clear consensus has
emerged. Or, if there is a consensus, it is one of ambiguity.
Out of the abyss of uncertainty, however, a trend may be
emerging. Early workplace technology cases were few and far
between and evinced trepidation at confronting the novel
issues.17 This apparent trepidation seemed to manifest itself in
reluctance to expand the privacy rights of workers, so that the
cases nearly always resolved in the employer’s favor.18 But the

communications and the penalties associated therewith); E-Government Act of
2002, 44 U.S.C. § 36 (2006) (discussing the management and promotion of
electronic government services); Wireless Communication and Public Safety
Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006) (discussing telecommunications carriers’
duty to protect the confidentiality of customers); PATRIOT Sunsets Extension
Act of 2011, S. 1038, 112th Cong. (2011) (discussing intelligence and terrorism
justifications for searching records).
16. See generally MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (3d
ed. 2009) (analyzing privacy in the employment relationship and discussing
relevant statutes and regulations); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton,
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our
Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2011) (describing harms posed by
digital hate and proposing solutions); Althaf Marsoof, Online Social
Networking and the Right to Privacy: The Conflicting Rights of Privacy and
Expression, 19 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 110 (2011) (discussing developments
in social networking and suggesting approaches to privacy-specific legislation);
Christopher E. Parker, The Rising Tide of Social Media, FED. LAW., May 2011,
at 14 (discussing implications of social media use in the workplace); MarieAndrée Weiss, The Use of Social Media Sites Data by Business Organizations
in Their Relationship with Employees, J. INTERNET L., Aug. 2011, at 16
(examining the pitfalls of using social media sites in decisions relating to
hiring, maintaining, and terminating employment).
17. Cf. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 886 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming summary judgment for employer because employer did not
“intercept” employee’s communications within meaning of Wiretap Act simply
by accessing employee’s secure bulletin board).
18. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114–15 (3d Cir.
2003) (concluding that employer accessing employee e-mail stored on
company’s central file servers without permission did not violate Electronic
Communications Privacy Act because employer owned the servers); Garrity v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676,
at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (holding that employees had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in work e-mail and that employer had legitimate
business interest in guarding the workplace against offensive
communications); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(dismissing employee’s claim on grounds employee could not establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy nor highly offensive invasion based on
employer’s interception of e-mail messages sent from employee’s home
computer through company e-mail system, notwithstanding employer’s
assurances that e-mail would not be intercepted); see also infra Part II
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tide may be turning. Though some courts remain wary of
entering the fray today, others are now tackling the issues
head on, and a relative flurry of recent activity may suggest a
trend in the opposite direction.19 This Article delves deeply into
this recent flurry and juxtaposes it against early workplace
technology law to expose the shifting trend. Further, it does so
in novel ways. While many scholars have opined about the
rights of workers and the needs of employers in light of
emerging technologies,20 this is the first scholarly work to
(discussing early technology cases and consensus in favor of employer
prerogative over employee privacy). In 2001, one commentator starkly exposed
this phenomenon by offering that “the employee’s right of privacy is a hollow
shell against the lead weight of the employer’s claim to run his business as he
pleases.” Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism and Autonomy in
American Labor Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 453, 475 (2001).
19. Cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756–60 (2010) (upholding
public employer’s search of text messages sent from and received on
employee’s employer-issued paging device, assuming without deciding that
employee had reasonable expectation of privacy but concluding that
employer’s search was reasonable); Steinbach v. Vill. of Forest Park, No. 06 C
4215, 2009 WL 2605283, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009) (denying employer’s
motion to dismiss intrusion upon seclusion claim brought after employer
searched plaintiff-employee’s work e-mail account because the defense based
on allegation of provider exemption under Stored Communications Act did not
apply given that third party, rather than employer, provided e-mail service);
Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548,
556, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding unlawful employer’s search of employee email account even though accessed on employer’s equipment because account
was maintained by third-party provider rather than employer and employee
therefore established reasonable expectation of privacy in such account); see
also infra Part II.A (discussing recent technology cases reflective of a trend
toward employee privacy rights).
20. See, e.g., Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A TwentyFirst Century Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 325–
28 (2011) (proposing a notice requirement and substantive restrictions in
workplace monitoring policies); Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague,
Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy Expectations Are Reasonable in
Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979 (2011)
(comparing worker privacy in Europe and the United States); Ariana R.
Levinson, Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment Act, 43 AKRON L.
REV. 331, 340–90 (2010) [hereinafter Levinson, Carpe Diem] (proposing
legislation to protect employee privacy rights); Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial
Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
609, 620–21 (2009) [hereinafter Levinson, Industrial Justice] (positing that no
systematic statutory scheme currently guides common law development of
employee privacy rights); Lindsay Noyce, Private Ordering of Employee
Privacy: Protecting Employees’ Expectations of Privacy with Implied-in-Fact
Contract Rights, 1 AM. U. J. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 27 (2011) (discussing evolution
of employee privacy rights in light of changing technology and advocating for
protection of employee privacy under implied-in-fact contract theory); Robert
Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United
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conduct a comprehensive analysis of ultra-recent developments
in the technology-based privacy rights of workers, and the only
to suggest a trend toward employee rights emerging from
them.21
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I surveys what
are termed here the “early” workplace technology privacy laws,
examining initial forays into the field by courts and legislatures
surrounding the turn of the new millennium, and attempting to
extract from those laws a theme favoring employer prerogative,
rooted in apprehension.22 Part II then fast forwards a decade or
more, examining more recent developments in workplace
technology laws, which stand in stark contrast to the reluctant
entries of the preceding era.23 Including discussion of case law,
statutes, administrative decisions, and position statements,
this Part offers a comprehensive look at modern-era regulation
of technology-based privacy concerns in the workplace,
revealing a shifting paradigm away from employer prerogative
States and Its De-evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
83 (2008) (arguing that employee privacy rights are diminishing and that
employer access to personal employee information is extending beyond
workplace into employee homes).
21. Much of the scholarly literature addressing workplace privacy in
modern technologies tackles the myriad implications for discovery, assuming
the eventual advent of litigation. See, e.g., Louise L. Hill, Gone But Not
Forgotten: When Privacy, Policy and Privilege Collide, 9 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 565 (2011) (examining employee privacy expectations as
relevant to application of attorney-client privilege when communications are
made over employer network or equipment). Other scholars lament the
absence or insufficiency of the current law to afford adequate protection to
employees. Levinson, Carpe Diem, supra note 20, at 331 (“Scholars generally
agree that the law in the United States fails to adequately protect employees
from technological monitoring.”); Levinson, Industrial Justice, supra note 20,
at 620–21 (lamenting the absence of statutory protection for employee privacy
in workplace technologies); Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model
Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 357 (2006) (“Currently,
the privacy protections in the United States are riddled with gaps and weak
spots.”). Still others suggest, quite contrary to this Article, that employee
privacy rights are actually diminishing. Sprague, supra note 20, at 89
(positing that “the current right to privacy in the United States [is] contextual,
fluid, and easily subject to elimination”). A few recognize the pro-employee
trend that this Article posits, but take a different approach. See, e.g., Michael
Z. Green, Against Dumpster-Diving for Email, 64 S.C. L. REV. 323, 348–62
(2012) (suggesting that employee privacy rights in workplace technologies may
be expanding, but focusing on cases and other legal developments specific to
application of attorney-client privilege). As such, this is the first scholarly
work to both take a comprehensive comparative approach and suggest a trend
toward employee rights.
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part II.
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in favor of employee rights. Part III then juxtaposes the early
laws of Part I against the recent developments of Part II,
offering explication of the apparent evolution, proposing
lessons to be gleaned from the development of the law, and
hypothesizing about potential next steps.24
I. EARLY FORAYS INTO WORKPLACE PRIVACY IN LIGHT
OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
The pioneer plaintiffs in workplace privacy cases involving
emerging technologies like e-mail and the Internet faced an
uphill battle, attempting to establish new rights in unfamiliar
territory. In an effort to give the appearance of credibility to
their otherwise novel claims, many of these trailblazing
plaintiffs pirated the causes of action commonly relied upon by
aggrieved employees and manipulated them to suit the
evolving circumstances. The absence of directly applicable
laws—whether judge-made or the product of state or federal
legislative reform—necessitates such an approach. Commonlaw tort claims such as invasion of privacy and intrusion upon
seclusion, as well as the tried-though-rarely-true wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, were therefore prime
suspects for the escapades of some early litigants. Others,
meanwhile, attempted to fashion viable claims out of statutes
addressed more directly to privacy in technology but not
necessarily adequate for the employment setting. Notably, and
as explained more fully below, in none of these cases were the
pioneering plaintiffs particularly successful.
A. THE EARLY COMMON-LAW CASES
1. A Firm Foundation of Disdain for Privacy Rights
The earliest forays into the domain of employee privacy
rights in emerging technologies date back to the early 1990s,25
when e-mail itself was in its relative infancy.26 Perhaps

24. See infra Part III.
25. See John D. Blackburn et al., Invasion of Privacy: Refocusing the Tort
in Private Sector Employment, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 41, 42 (1993) (“Advanced
technology in sophisticated information systems . . . contribute[s] to a
continuing concern about privacy in the workplace.”).
26. See The 41-Year History of Email, MASHABLE (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://mashable.com/2012/09/20/evolution-email/ (discussing how internet
service providers allowed widespread access to the internet in 1991, but there
were still limited options).
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reflective of the trepidation with which the courts entered the
fray, one of the earliest decisions addressing employee privacy
claims related to technological monitoring, Bourke v. Nissan
Motor Corp., was never published and thus is not widely
available.27 In that case, the court’s swift rejection of the
plaintiffs’ claims starkly illustrates the court’s distaste for the
suggestion that such privacy rights should exist.28 The
plaintiffs, Bonita Bourke and Rhonda Hall, worked for Nissan
Motor Corp. as Information Systems Specialists tasked
primarily with troubleshooting for personnel who used the
central computer system at Infiniti dealerships.29 After random
discovery of an e-mail message sent by Bourke to a dealership
employee, which was of a personal, sexual nature, Nissan
conducted a further review of Bourke’s e-mail and found
“substantial numbers of personal, including sexual, messages
from Bourke” as well as her co-plaintiff Hall.30 The subject email messages violated Nissan’s policy prohibiting personal use
of the company computer system, so Nissan issued disciplinary
warnings to both Bourke and Hall as a result of its discovery.31
Subsequently, both plaintiffs received poor performance
reviews.32 Nissan then issued Bourke a final disciplinary
warning when her performance continued to suffer, but she
resigned the day after receiving it.33 The company terminated
Hall’s employment the same day.34
Shortly after leaving Nissan, Bourke and Hall joined as
plaintiffs in a suit against the company, claiming that Nissan’s
review of their e-mail accounts constituted a common-law
invasion of privacy, violated their constitutional right to
privacy as well as criminal wiretapping and eavesdropping
statutes, and gave rise to a claim for wrongful discharge in

27. See Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. July
26, 1993), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_v_Nissan.html.
The decision does not appear in either of the primary legal databases,
Westlaw or LexisNexis, but it has a dedicated page on Wikipedia. See Bourke
v. Nissan Motor Co., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bourke_v._
Nissan_Motor_Co. (last updated Nov. 8, 2013).
28. Cf. Bourke, No. B068705.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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violation of public policy.35 The trial court granted Nissan’s
motion for summary judgment, refusing to recognize any
reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace e-mail, and
plaintiffs appealed.36 The plaintiffs fared no better at the
appellate level, though.37 Addressing first the plaintiffs’ claims
that Nissan violated privacy rights protected by both the
common law and the Constitution, the court gave short shrift to
the plaintiffs’ allegations, finding that the company’s computer
policy permitting only business use, coupled with the plaintiffs’
knowledge that Nissan employees other than the intended
recipient could review e-mail messages, negated any objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in them.38 In the absence of
any such reasonable expectation, their privacy claims failed.39
The plaintiffs’ remaining claims fared no better.40 Both of
the statutory causes of action failed on the grounds that
neither statute invoked by the plaintiffs addressed interception
of e-mail.41 Instead, both were addressed to communication
modes like telegraphs and telephone wires that existed at a
time when no one even contemplated the eventual invention
now known as electronic mail.42 And, the plaintiffs’ claims of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy likewise failed
to pass muster, as the absence of a constitutional right to
privacy in the e-mail, announced earlier in the court’s opinion,
obviated its demise—without a public policy violation, no
wrongful discharge could have occurred.43 Thus, in this very
early clash between employee privacy rights and workplace
technologies, the prerogative of the employer to control its
workplace easily prevailed.
Another three years would pass after the decision in
Bourke before the case that became widely known as the first
published opinion addressing employee privacy rights in e-mail
would appear.44 That case was Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., rendered
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (discussing California Penal Code sections 631 and 632).
43. Id.
44. Cf. Charles J. Muhl, Workplace E-mail and Internet Use: Employees
and Employers Beware, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 2003, at 36, 37 (“Employees
often mistakenly believe that their use of the Internet and e-mail at the
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in 1996, and, like Bourke, it also followed the common-law
route.45 Plaintiff-employee Smyth, relying upon his employer’s
repeated assurances that all e-mail communications would
remain confidential and could not supply grounds for
termination, exchanged several e-mail messages with his
supervisor that the company contends derided management.46
Notwithstanding its clear policy to the contrary, Pillsbury
terminated Smyth’s employment on the basis of the
“inappropriate and unprofessional comments” made in the email messages.47 Smyth then brought a diversity lawsuit in
Pennsylvania federal court seeking relief under the traditional
employment tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy.48 Without even filing an answer, Pillsbury responded
with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).49
The court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss only
four months after the complaint was filed and without any
other proceedings taking place.50 Its discussion of the law
began with a caution-ridden exposition of the tort’s narrow
scope.51 In Pennsylvania, as in many or indeed most of the
forty-nine states in which the at-will doctrine persists,52
erosions of the employer’s ability to discharge an employee for
any reason remain narrow.53 The court explained that

workplace is private when, in fact, courts have found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in such use and have consistently permitted employers
to monitor and review activity. The seminal case in this area is Smyth v. The
Pillsbury Company . . . .”).
45. See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996). As
evidence of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s role as seminal, the court in
Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. referenced “a dearth of
case law on privacy issues with regard to office email,” then cited Smyth as
“instructive.” Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 00-12143RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002).
46. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98–99.
47. Id. at 98.
48. Id. at 99.
49. Id. at 98; Docket, Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (No. 95-CV-05712).
50. Docket, supra note 49.
51. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 99.
52. See generally Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA.
L. REV. 951, 986 n.159 (2011) (“The at-will rule is that an employee may be
fired for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all . . . . The at-will rule is
the law in forty-nine states with Montana the sole exception.”).
53. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 99 (“Pennsylvania is an employment atwill jurisdiction and an employer may discharge an employee with or without
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Pennsylvania law recognizes exceptions to the at-will doctrine
only “in the most limited of circumstances, . . . where discharge
of an at-will employee threatens or violates a clear mandate of
public policy,” cautioning that the “exception is an especially
narrow one.”54 Specifically, Pennsylvania courts had recognized
the tort in only three limited circumstances: when an employee
is discharged for serving on jury duty, when an employer
refuses hire based on a prior conviction, and when an employee
is fired for proper reporting of federal-regulation violations.55
In each circumstance, the court that rendered the decision
relied directly and heavily upon a clearly defined and firmly
established public policy, embodied in legislation, judicial
decisions, or administrative rules or regulations.56 Thus, the
cause, at pleasure, unless restrained by some contract.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. In the case of jury duty, the rendering court cited the Pennsylvania
Constitution and state statutes referencing “the necessity of having citizens
freely available for jury service.” Id. (quoting Reuther v. Fowler & Williams,
Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)). As to use of prior convictions in
hiring, the court that issued the decision cited the state constitution and
judicial decisions reflecting “‘the deeply ingrained public policy of this
State . . . to avoid unwarranted stigmatization of and unreasonable
restrictions upon former offenders.’” Id. (quoting Hunter v. Port Auth. of
Allegheny Cnty., 419 A.2d 631, 636 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)). Finally, as to
reporting violations of federal regulations, the rendering court relied upon
policies typically supporting whistleblower protections, including that the
pertinent law required the employee to report the violations, that the
employee possessed relevant knowledge and expertise to inform his report,
and that the employee did not bypass any internal reporting procedures. Id.
(citing Field v. Phila. Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)).
“Whistleblower” is the term commonly used to refer to an employee who
reports unlawful activity by his employer. See Whistleblower Definition,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whistleblowing (last visited Feb. 7,
2014) (“A whistleblower (whistle-blower or whistle blower) is a person who
exposes misconduct, alleged dishonest or illegal activity occurring in an
organization.” (footnote omitted)). Whistleblower protection laws have
flourished in recent years, particularly in the wake of the Enron and
Worldcom debacles which were brought to light by corporate whistleblowers.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (providing civil private right of action and
remedy for whistleblowers who report violations of various securities laws,
among other things); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, § 1558, 124 Stat. 119, 261 (2010) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 218C (2012))
(providing broad protection from retaliation for employees who report
violations of the Act’s provisions); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115, 297 (2009) (prohibiting any
private employer or state or local government entity receiving funds under the
Act from retaliating against employees who disclose information concerning
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court made plain that the applicable law recognizes a viable
claim only when the public policy allegedly violated by the
employee’s discharge is clearly defined in a firmly established
law.57
Because Smyth’s claim fit into none of the pigeonholes
established under Pennsylvania law—his claim had nothing to
do with jury duty, a prior conviction, or whistleblowing58—he
faced a substantial uphill battle. Attempting to convince the
court to drill a new pigeonhole, Smyth contended that his
discharge violated the state’s public policy favoring an
employee’s right to privacy, as reflected in common law.59 He
relied upon a decision from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc.,60 in
which the plaintiff-employee claimed wrongful discharge upon
her refusal to submit to a urinalysis and a search of her
personal property at work.61 Borse, like Smyth, was also in
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.62 The Borse
court therefore searched Pennsylvania law for instruction on
whether the courts of that state would recognize a claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy on the basis of
an invasion of privacy.63 Finding no binding state law on point,
the Third Circuit engaged in an “Erie guess”—an informed

improper use of stimulus funds); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, § 219, 122 Stat. 3016, 3062 (prohibiting
retaliation against employees who provide information about violations of the
Act to his or her employer, to the federal government, or to the attorney
general of any state); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806,
116 Stat. 745, 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012)) (making unlawful
retaliation by publicly held companies against whistleblower employees who
make certain covered disclosures).
57. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101 (“[D]efendant’s actions did not
tortiously invade the plaintiff’s privacy and, therefore, did not violate public
policy.”).
58. See id. at 100.
59. Id.
60. 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992).
61. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100.
62. See id. (discussing the Third Circuit’s application of Pennsylvania law,
which occurs only in diversity cases); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012)
(providing for jurisdiction in federal courts over state-law claims on the basis
of diversity of citizenship); Borse, 963 F.2d at 613 (“The district court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 . . . . Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law
of the state whose laws govern the action.”).
63. Borse, 963 F.2d at 621–22.
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supposition about what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would decide if it were faced with a comparable situation.64
The court in Borse concluded that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court might recognize a claim of wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy based on invasion of privacy, but
only if the alleged invasion was “substantial and highly
offensive.”65 Further, the court projected that in determining
whether an alleged invasion of privacy is substantial and
highly offensive to a reasonable person, “Pennsylvania would
adopt a balancing test which balances the employee’s privacy
interest against the employer’s interest in maintaining a drugfree workplace.”66 Having announced those principles of law,
though, the Borse court then remanded, with instructions that
the district court grant the plaintiff leave to amend so that she
might allege specifically how her employer’s actions violated
her right to privacy.67 Thus, while the Borse decision offered
Smyth some grounds upon which to rest his contention that his
claim was viable, it lacked any specific instruction as to how
the court’s hypothesized standard might apply.68
The Smyth court did not question the reliability of the
Borse court’s crafted rules, or, more generally, that the law of
Pennsylvania would recognize the tort of wrongful discharge
based on violation of the public policy favoring employee
privacy.69 Nevertheless, the court concluded that Smyth failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.70 The
central fallacy in Smyth’s claim, according to the court, was a
broad proposition of law that wields especially significant

64. Id. at 625 (“[W]e predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
apply a balancing test to determine whether the Shop’s drug and alcohol
program . . . invaded Borse’s privacy.”). The term “Erie guess” refers to the
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which
held that state substantive law applies in federal courts sitting in diversity.
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). When there is no state law
on point, the federal court is forced to guess how the highest court of that state
would decide the issue, if it were presented. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.
v. Ernst & Young LLP, 542 F.3d 475, 482–83 (5th Cir. 2008) (“When state law
provides no definitive answers to the question presented, we must make an
educated ‘Erie guess’ as to how the [state] Supreme Court would resolve the
issue.”).
65. Borse, 963 F.2d at 621.
66. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100 (citing Borse, 963 F.2d at 625).
67. Id. (citing Borse, 963 F.2d at 626).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 101.
70. Id. at 100–01.
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weight here—that an employee lacks “a reasonable expectation
of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made by an
employee to his supervisor over the company e-mail system.”71
Perhaps even more importantly, the court boldly declared this
so, “notwithstanding any assurances that such communications
would not be intercepted by management.”72 Then, further
entrenching its cool reception to any suggestion of privacy in email, the court distinguished the e-mail context of Smyth’s case
from the urinalysis exam at issue in Borse: “Significantly, the
defendant did not require plaintiff, as in the case of an
urinalysis or personal property search[,] to disclose any
personal information about himself. Rather, plaintiff
voluntarily
communicated
the
alleged
unprofessional
comments over the company e-mail system. We find no privacy
interests in such communications.”73 Thus, the court, seemingly
without the least hesitation, declared quite unequivocally that
employees should expect no privacy in workplace e-mail
communications.
The court’s stark scorn for any claimed privacy in
workplace electronic communications did not end there,
however. The court went on to declare that even if a reasonable
expectation of privacy could be found (and although here it
could not), a reasonable person could not consider the
interception of Smyth’s e-mail communications “to be a
substantial and highly offensive invasion of . . . privacy.”74
Again the court relied upon the distinction it perceived between
urinalysis and physical searches of personal property, on one
hand, and review of e-mail communications, on the other.75 The
court justified its conclusion in light of the policy favoring
employer control: “Moreover, the company’s interest in
preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even
illegal activity over its e-mail system outweighs any privacy
interest the employee may have in those comments.”76 Thus,
the court unwaveringly declined to recognize any employee
privacy interest in e-mail communications sent on the company

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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system, notwithstanding a published policy statement to the
contrary.77 Employer prerogative reigned supreme.
The palpable malevolence for employee privacy expressed
by the Smyth court is remarkable, but the impact of its holding
is confounded by the procedural posture. The court decided the
case on a motion to dismiss filed even before an answer to the
complaint.78 The essence of such motions is that the plaintiff’s
complaint fails to state an actionable claim so that, under the
standard that governed at the time, the motion could be
granted only if the court concluded that plaintiff could prove
“no set of facts” that would support his claim for relief.79 The
standard was quite forgiving, and resulted in dismissal only
when the complaint revealed that the claims were indubitably
defective, regardless of any then-unknown facts a plaintiff
might conceivably muster in support.80 The precedential effect
77. See id.
78. Id. at 98; Docket, Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (No. 95-CV-05712).
79. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). As any litigator,
proceduralist, or even first-year law student undoubtedly knows, the United
States Supreme Court in recent years rendered two seminal decisions
addressing the standard governing such motions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). While some debate lingers among the courts
and commentators as to whether, and if so, to what extent, Twombly and Iqbal
altered the standard under Rule 12(b)(6), it is generally accepted that the
Court “retired” the Conley “no set of facts” standard in favor of a “plausibility”
standard and that, at a minimum, it is possible for a court to interpret and
apply that plausibility standard in such a way that might lead to dismissal of
some cases that would have survived under Conley. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670
(describing Twombly’s effect as retirement of Conley’s pleading standard);
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (stating that Conley’s “no set of facts” standard “has
earned its retirement”); JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf
(reviewing empirical data concerning motions to dismiss filed before and after
Twombly and Iqbal, and concluding that no statistically significant change
occurred in how motions were resolved before those decisions as compared to
after).
80. E.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 6, 18 n.60 (2010)
(explaining development of pleadings law and indicating that dismissal
became more likely under Twombly and Iqbal than it had been under Conley);
A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 434–35
(2008) (describing the pleading regime under Conley as “simplified” and as
more permissive to plaintiffs than under the modernized standard); Michael
C. Dorf, Should Congress Change the Standard for Dismissing a Federal
Lawsuit?, FINDLAW (July 29, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20090729.html (“Twombly and Iqbal make it harder for plaintiffs who might
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of such decisions was significant because the holding indicated
not just that the plaintiff in that particular case could not
muster sufficient proof of his claims, but rather could be read
more broadly to stand for the proposition that the law would
not recognize a claim in any such comparable case. The import
of Smyth as the trailblazing opinion addressing privacy in
workplace technologies81 was therefore salient: a plaintiff lacks
any reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace e-mail
communications, even if the employer expressly guarantees
otherwise, and the employer’s enforcement of its rights to
monitor employee e-mail cannot support a claim for relief by an
aggrieved employee.82
2. In Smyth’s Wake
On the heels of Smyth, other courts confronting commonlaw claims that arose from monitoring of workplace
technologies followed the Smyth court’s lead.83 McLaren v.
Microsoft Corp. is archetypal and mirrors Smyth in myriad
respects.84 Plaintiff Bill McLaren worked for Microsoft
Corporation in Texas.85 He worked in an office environment,
and Microsoft furnished him with a networked computer and email address.86 When another employee accused McLaren of
sexual
harassment,
Microsoft
suspended
McLaren’s
employment pending an investigation into the accusations.87 In
response, McLaren requested access to his e-mail in an effort to
disprove the allegations, but Microsoft refused general access,
have meritorious cases, but need access to defense witnesses and files, to have
their cases heard.”).
81. Unpublished decisions entered prior to Smyth reached conclusions
consistent with it. See, e.g., Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal.
Ct. App. July 26, 1993), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_
v_Nissan.html (holding that plaintiff employees had no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mail messages sent on company computer system
despite employees’ subjective belief to the contrary due to fact that access was
limited by password). The Bourke decision is particularly notable because the
right to privacy of California citizens is firmly rooted in an amendment to that
state’s constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
82. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100–01.
83. See, e.g., Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 0012143-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002); McLaren v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. May 28,
1999).
84. See McLaren, 1999 WL 339015.
85. Id. at *1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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instead requiring that he specify to company officials the
identity and location of individual messages he wished to see.88
He never made any such request, and Microsoft terminated his
employment shortly thereafter.89
McLaren filed suit in Texas state court claiming an
invasion of privacy by Microsoft when it accessed e-mail
messages stored in “personal folders” on his work computer and
subsequently disclosed the contents of those messages to “third
parties.”90 McLaren contended that he manifested a reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mail messages stored in those
“personal folders” because Microsoft’s system enabled him to
create a password to restrict access to those folders, and he
took advantage of that technology.91 In response, Microsoft
filed, inter alia, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.92 The trial court granted
Microsoft’s motion, and McLaren appealed.93
The analysis of the Texas Court of Appeals in McLaren
bears striking similarities to that of the federal district court in
Smyth.94 After finding no merit in McLaren’s preliminary
procedural objection, the court proceeded to conclude, just as
the court in Smyth did, that the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy
claim must fail as a matter of law because he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mail messages, and,
even if he did, Microsoft’s review of them would not have been
highly offensive to a reasonable person.95 A key component of
McLaren’s privacy argument rested upon the password-

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Cf. id. (“McLaren allege[d] . . . that [b]y allowing [him] to have a
personal store password for his personal folders, [McLaren] manifested and
[Microsoft] recognized an expectation that the personal folders would be free
from intrusion and interference.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals referred to Microsoft’s response as a
“special exception,” but its description of the procedural device indicates that
it is comparable to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at *2
(describing a special exception under Texas procedural rules).
93. Id. at *2.
94. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp.
97 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
95. McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *2, *4–5. The court concluded that “a
reasonable person would not consider Microsoft’s interception of these
communications to be a highly offensive invasion.” Id. at *5.
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protection afforded to his e-mail messages by Microsoft.96 The
e-mail system that Microsoft utilized allowed McLaren to
restrict access to his personal e-mail folders with a “personal
store” password created by him.97 This password afforded
additional protection beyond the network password that
McLaren used to access the Microsoft network.98 McLaren
contended that by allowing him to protect his personal folders
with a password known only by him, Microsoft should have
known that McLaren expected privacy in messages stored
there—privacy that Microsoft invaded when it decrypted his
personal store password and accessed his folders.99
In support of his contention that the personal store
password gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy,
McLaren relied principally on an invasion of privacy case that
arose in a more traditional setting.100 In K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti,
the plaintiff-employee claimed invasion of privacy when KMart searched the locker provided for her use at work.101 The
Texas Court of Appeals held that, even though the locker was
the employer’s property and would be subject to legitimate
searches while unlocked, the “employee manifested, and the
employer recognized, an expectation that the locker and its
contents would be free from intrusion and interference” solely
because, with the employer’s knowledge, the employee provided
her own lock.102 McLaren argued that the password he created
to protect the contents of his personal folders was directly
analogous to the employee-provided lock in Trotti, and should
likewise dictate a finding that his expectation of privacy was
reasonable.103
The court disagreed with McLaren’s suggestion, coolly
rejecting the opportunity to import traditional privacy
protections into the modern workplace.104 As a threshold
matter, the court distinguished Trotti’s locker, provided solely
for personal use, from McLaren’s e-mail, which was integral to

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1984).
Id. at 637.
See McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *4.
See id.
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his work.105 Reasoning that “the e-mail messages contained on
the company computer were not McLaren’s personal property,
but were merely an inherent part of the office environment,”
the court rejected McLaren’s argument that “only the
technology is different.”106 K-Mart provided Trotti’s locker
solely for storage of her personal belongings, but Microsoft
provided McLaren’s computer and e-mail to enable him to
perform his job.107
In a similar vein, the court also distinguished McLaren’s
case from Trotti’s on grounds that her locker “was a discrete,
physical place where the employee, separate and apart from
other employees, could store her tangible, personal
belongings.”108 By contrast, even those messages stored in
McLaren’s personal folders only ended up there after passing
through the employer’s network where they were fully
accessible by Microsoft officials.109 The crux of the court’s
rationale here seemed to be that because Trotti did not use the
locker for any work-related purpose and stored only personal
belongings there, its physical separation from the employer’s
property supported a viable expectation of privacy. McLaren,
on the other hand, lacked any such reasonable expectation
because the e-mail system on which he stored his “personal”
messages also contained work-related messages, albeit in
different locations.110 The folders containing personal
messages, according to the court, were not “discrete” in the way
that Trotti’s locker was, and thus warranted different
treatment.111 In the end, the employer’s prerogative to monitor
and search the employee’s use of workplace technologies,
notwithstanding their “personal” label, prevailed.112
The turn of the new millennium did not usher in much
change in the approach courts took toward the privacy rights of
employees in workplace technologies. The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, deciding

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (noting that e-mail was provided so employees could perform jobrelated functions).
111. See id. (noting that the messages were initially transmitted over the
company network).
112. See id.
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Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., continued
the trend of rejecting common-law claims begun by the Smyth
and McLaren courts, citing both as definitive authorities for the
proposition that an employee has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in e-mail messages transmitted via an employer’s
network.113 The plaintiffs Nancy Garrity and Joanne Clark
sued defendant John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company
(“Hancock”) when Hancock terminated their employment after
discovering that both plaintiff-employees had transmitted
numerous sexually explicit e-mail messages, many from
internet joke sites, over the company’s e-mail system.114
Hancock contended that their conduct violated its e-mail policy,
which prohibited “sexually oriented” messages and threatened
disciplinary action for “inappropriate use of E-mail.”115 The
policy also reserved Hancock’s rights to review e-mail, albeit
while indicating that such review would not occur with
regularity: “All information stored, transmitted, received or
contained in the company’s E-mail systems is the property of
John Hancock. It is not company policy to intentionally inspect
E-mail usage. However, there may be business or legal
situations that necessitate company review of E-mail messages
and other documents.”116
After Hancock terminated the plaintiffs’ employment based
on its perception that the plaintiffs had violated the company email policy, plaintiffs sued, asserting, among other things,
claims for invasion of privacy, violation of the Massachusetts
Wiretap Act,117 and wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy.118 Hancock filed a motion for summary judgment, which
the court swiftly granted, offering only short explanations for
the dismissal of each claim.119 First, the court flatly rejected
the plaintiffs’ contention that the company’s provision of
password-protected personal e-mail folders gave rise to a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mail messages those
folders contained.120 Citing Smyth as instructive and adopting

113. Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002).
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (1998).
118. Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *1.
119. Id. at *1–4.
120. Id. at *1–2.
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wholesale the rationale offered in McLaren, the court reasoned
that the plaintiffs’ privacy expectations were unreasonable,
notwithstanding the opportunity to create password-protected
folders, because all messages contained in those folders had
first to pass through the employer’s network.121 Further, the
court went on to state that even if plaintiffs had some
reasonable privacy expectations, the employer’s “legitimate
business interest in protecting its employees from harassment
in the workplace would likely trump [those] privacy
interests.”122 As such, plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim
failed.123
The Garrity plaintiffs were no more successful on their
remaining claims.124 First, as to their statutory claim under the
Massachusetts Wiretap Act, the court concluded, with little
explanation, that the communications at issue fell outside the
scope of the statute’s protection because “the reading of e-mails,
after they have been transmitted to the recipient, does not
constitute ‘interception’ within the wiretap statute.”125 The
statute, which was originally enacted in an effort to redress
wiretapping and eavesdropping in organized crime, pre-dated
the inception and spread of e-mail by several decades.126 As
such, the statute is ill-equipped to address modern needs.
Moreover, Massachusetts courts had already, prior to the
decision in Garrity, interpreted the statute in such a way as to
exclude e-mail messages stored in application or network
folders because the reading of stored messages does not
constitute “interception,”127—the act that the statute

121. Id. at *2 (citing McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV,
1999 WL 339015, at *4 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *3–4.
125. Id. at *3 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (1998)).
126. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(A) (“The general court finds that
organized crime exists within the commonwealth and that the increasing
activities of organized crime constitute a grave danger to the public welfare
and safety.”).
127. Id. (defining interception as “to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid
another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any intercepting device”); see Mark E.
Schreiber, Employer E-mail and Internet Risks, Policy Guidelines and
Investigations, 85 MASS. L. REV. 74, 86 (2000) (“One can expect further
interpretations of this state’s wiretap statute to exclude from liability
employer e-mail or Internet monitoring efforts, provided such systems have a
demonstrable business purpose.”).
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prohibits.128 Second, their wrongful discharge tort claim
likewise failed, on grounds that it was duplicative of the
invasion-of-privacy and statutory claims and thus effectively
fell to preemption.129 And, finding no greater success on their
remaining claims—one under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) and one for defamation, neither of which
is especially relevant here—the plaintiffs’ case was dismissed
in its entirety.130 Thus, the Garrity plaintiffs, like those who
came before them in Bourke, Smyth, and McLaren, garnered
little sympathy for their alleged privacy violations, as the court
in each case swiftly rejected the efforts of every plaintiff to
carve out even a sliver of asylum in the abyss of cyberspace.
B. EARLY STATUTORY CLAIMS
Trailblazing plaintiffs aggrieved by workplace technology
searches that they perceived as unfair and improper looked not
only to the common law, but also to state and federal statutes,
in an effort to find a remedy.131 For the most part, they met no
warmer reception on their statutory claims than their commonlaw ones, though. The statutes, like the common law, pre-dated
the advent and spread of e-mail and the internet, and were
therefore ill-suited to redress the wrongs that the plaintiffs
alleged. Moreover, the judges who were deciding their claims
faced a new frontier, attempting to apply antiquated legal
regimes to complex and rapidly evolving technologies, with
which many of them were mostly or even wholly unfamiliar.132
The result was near wholesale rejection of the pioneer
plaintiffs’ efforts to find relief via statute, often as readily and
swiftly as the courts had rejected their common-law claims.133

128. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(A); Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3
(indicating that the Massachusetts Wiretap Act should be interpreted in
accordance with the construction given to the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) by federal courts); Eagle Inv. Sys. Corp. v. Tamm,
146 F. Supp. 2d 105, 112 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that the ECPA prohibits
only acquisition of electronic communications that occur during transmission).
129. Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3.
130. Id. at *4 (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
131. See, e.g., Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3–4; Bourke v. Nissan Motor
Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 1993), available at
http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_v_Nissan.html.
132. See, e.g., Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3–4; Bourke, No. B068705.
133. See, e.g., Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3–4; Bourke, No. B068705.
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1. Claims Invoking Antiquated State Statutes
Employee-plaintiffs relied on state statutes in an effort to
carve out a respite of privacy protection in workplace
technologies as far back as the early 1990s, when the
technologies themselves were still in their infancy. Bourke,
discussed at some length above, is illustrative.134 Plaintiffs
Bourke and Hall, disgruntled by Nissan’s termination of their
employment after the discovery of personal and sexual
messages on their company e-mail, not only brought commonlaw and constitutional claims for invasion of privacy, but also
asserted claims under two state statutes.135 The first statute,
prohibited:
California
Penal
Code
section
631,136
“[I]ntentional[] tap[ping], or mak[ing] any unauthorized
connection . . . with any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable,
or instrument, . . . or . . . read[ing], or attempt[ing] to read, or
learn the contents of any message, report, or communication
while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line or
cable . . . .”137
A separate provision afforded a civil remedy for the kind of
wiretapping that the statute prohibits, but the court still
rejected the claim because the statute did not cover “retrieval,
printing and reading of E-mail messages.”138 Moreover, the
court reasoned that the statute had no bearing on the case
because Nissan, as the provider of the network service on
which the subject e-mail messages were sent, received, and
stored, did not need to “tap” into anything—the messages were
readily available to Nissan on the system that it owned and
operated.139 Nor did Nissan access the messages during any
transmission, as they were already in storage when Nissan
reviewed them.140 Thus, even while acknowledging the
antiquated nature of the law, the court concluded summarily:
“E-mail messages simply are not included within the actions
proscribed by Penal Code section 631.”141
The court adopted similar reasoning in rejecting the second
statutory provision invoked by the Bourke plaintiffs, California
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Bourke, No. B068705; see supra notes 28–43 (discussing Bourke).
Bourke, No. B068705.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 2011).
Bourke, No. B068705 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 631).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Penal Code section 632.142 That statute “prohibits the
eavesdropping or recording of a ‘confidential communication by
means of any electronic amplifying or recording device.’”143 The
court found it inapposite just as readily as section 631: “Again,
the plain words of the statute simpl[y] do not permit a finding
that Nissan’s conduct violated the law, as no amplifying or
recording device was used to retrieve and read plaintiffs’ Email messages.”144 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ statutory
claims wholesale, concluding that the statutes had no bearing
on an employer’s review of worker e-mail.145
The court in Garrity, considering a Massachusetts wiretap
statute strikingly similar to the California provisions invoked
in Bourke, reached the same result on nearly identical
reasoning.146 The subject statute, Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 272, section 99, prohibits interception of wire and oral
communications.147 Just as did the court in Bourke, the Garrity
court concluded swiftly that an employer’s review of an
employee’s stored e-mail communications fell outside the ambit
of the statute’s protection: “Because the reading of e-mails,
after they have been transmitted to the recipient, does not
constitute ‘interception’ within the wiretap statute, plaintiffs’
claim fails.”148 Further, the court also indicated that even if the
kind of e-mail review conducted by the employer amounted to
“interception” under the statute, it still might not apply
because the statute’s “ordinary business exemption” could
protect the automatic back-up system on which the plaintiffs’
reviewed e-mails were stored.149 Thus, just as in Bourke, the
court readily concluded that the state statute invoked by the
plaintiffs applied only to more arcane forms of wire and oral
communications and had no bearing on plaintiffs’ gripes about
Hancock’s review of their e-mail.150

142. See id.
143. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 632).
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *3 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
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2. Claims Premised on Evolving Federal Statutes
The original federal counterparts to the California and
Massachusetts wiretap statutes at issue in Bourke and Garrity,
respectively, likewise addressed only older forms of wire and
oral communications and did not anticipate the changes that
accompanied the evolution of electronic data and
communication modes. As such, the original statutes were
wholly ill-suited to redress the privacy claims of employees
complaining that employers had improperly reviewed their
electronic mail or other internet use in the workplace. Congress
led the way in amending the subject statutes to account for the
evolving technologies, but even so, the changes themselves are
now antiquated and are not without their lingering
shortcomings.
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States
Secret Service arose in a non-workplace setting but is
nevertheless a precedent on which courts confronting
workplace claims commonly rely for its interpretation of the
federal statutes addressed to review and interception of wire
and electronic communications.151 The plaintiffs in Steve
Jackson Games were the operator, Steve Jackson Games, Inc.
(SJG), and users (various individuals) of an electronic bulletin
board on which the users exchanged and stored e-mail
messages related to SJG’s business, which included roleplaying games and related publications, among other things.152
The United States Secret Service, in connection with an
unrelated investigation, confiscated the SJG computer on
which such e-mail messages were exchanged and stored.153
Plaintiffs then sued, claiming that when the Secret Service
151. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“Every circuit court to have considered the matter has held that an ‘intercept’
under the ECPA must occur contemporaneously with transmission . . . . The
first case to do so, Steve Jackson Games, noted that ‘intercept’ was defined as
contemporaneous in the context of an aural communication under the old
Wiretap Act . . . .”); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876–77
(9th Cir. 2002) (“In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service,
36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit held that the government’s
acquisition of email messages stored on an electronic bulletin board system,
but not yet retrieved by the intended recipients, was not an ‘interception’
under the Wiretap Act . . . . We agree with the Steve Jackson [] court[] that the
narrow definition of ‘intercept’ applies to electronic communications.”); Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
152. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458.
153. Id. at 459.
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reviewed and deleted the “private” e-mail messages from the
SJG computer, it violated the Privacy Protection Act,154 the
Federal Wiretap Act, as amended by Title I of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),155 and Title II of the
ECPA.156
Fruitful discussion of these statutes necessitates, as a
precursor, some enlightenment on their historical development.
The statutory scheme, which is at best described as
“complex”157 and perhaps more appropriately denominated as
perplexing, includes the Federal Wiretap Act and both Titles I
and II of the ECPA, the latter of which is commonly referred to
as the Stored Communications Act (SCA).158 The Federal
Wiretap Act, out of which the other related laws have
developed over time, originated as an effort to combat
wiretapping and eavesdropping of the sort that permeated
organized crime in the 1960s.159 It was not until more than
twenty years later that Congress added to the Wiretap Act
protections for electronic communications as well, via the
ECPA.160 The ECPA, in turn, separated the protections it
afforded electronic communications into two categories: (1)
communications in transit, the “interception” of which was
154. Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006). The Privacy
Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for the government, while conducting
a criminal investigation, “to search for or seize any work product materials
possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to
the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public
communication . . . .” Id. § 2000aa(a). The PPA is not directly relevant to this
Article; as such, the plaintiffs’ PPA claim in Steve Jackson Games does not
warrant substantial attention or analysis here.
155. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2012).
156. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
157. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[T]he intersection of . . . [the Wiretap Act, as amended by the ECPA, and the
SCA,] is a complex, often convoluted, area of the law.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
158. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications
Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208,
1208 (“The privacy of stored Internet communications in the United States is
governed by a federal statute known as the Stored Communications Act
(‘SCA’). The SCA was enacted in 1986 as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.” (footnote omitted)).
159. See generally Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the
Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 12–14 (2004) (discussing origin
and enactment of Wiretap Act in 1960s).
160. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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proscribed by Title I of the ECPA; and (2) communications in
“storage,” which were protected by Title II of the ECPA, also
known as the SCA.161 As explained by the Fifth Circuit:
Section 2511 was enacted in 1968 as part of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, often
referred to as the Federal Wiretap Act. Prior to the 1986
amendment by Title I of the ECPA, it covered only wire and oral
communications. Title I of the ECPA extended that coverage to
electronic communications. In relevant part, § 2511(1)(a) proscribes
“intentionally intercept[ing] . . . any wire, oral, or electronic
communication”, unless the intercept is authorized by court order
or by other exceptions not relevant here. Section 2520 authorizes,
inter alia, persons whose electronic communications are
intercepted in violation of § 2511 to bring a civil action against the
interceptor for actual damages, or for statutory damages of $10,000
per violation or $100 per day of the violation, whichever is greater.
18 U.S.C. § 2520.162

Attempting to invoke the relatively new protections
afforded by the ECPA, the Steve Jackson Games plaintiffs sued
the Secret Service, claiming that its review of e-mail messages
on the confiscated computer violated both Titles of the
ECPA.163 The district court awarded damages on the plaintiffs’
Title II claim, finding that the Secret Service violated the SCA
by seizing electronic communications (e-mail messages) stored
on the confiscated computer.164 Their claim under Title I,
however, failed: “[The court] held that the Secret Service did
not ‘intercept’ the E-mail in violation of Title I of the ECPA, 18
161. Id.; see Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2521 (2012); Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012).
162. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th
Cir. 1994) (footnotes omitted). The Ninth Circuit has also offered a relatively
pithy summary of the relevant statutory development:
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, which was intended to
afford privacy protection to electronic communications. Title I of the
ECPA amended the federal Wiretap Act, which previously addressed
only wire and oral communications, to “address the interception
of . . . electronic communications.” S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557. Title II of the ECPA
created the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which was designed to
“address[ ] access to stored wire and electronic communications and
transactional records.”
Konop, 302 F.3d at 874.
163. Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 459. The plaintiffs also brought a
claim under the federal Privacy Protection Act, but that claim, pertinent only
to searches conducted in the course of governmental criminal investigations, is
not relevant to this Article and thus is not discussed in any detail here.
164. Id.
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U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), because its acquisition of the contents of
the electronic communications was not contemporaneous with
the transmission of those communications.”165 The sole
question on appeal, then, addressed the propriety of the court’s
rejection of the Title I claim: “[W]hether the seizure of a
computer on which is stored private E-mail that has been sent
to an electronic bulletin board, but not yet read (retrieved) by
the recipients, constitutes an ‘intercept’ proscribed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1)(a).”166 The court engaged in a relatively lengthy
analysis of the issue but ultimately upheld the district court’s
determination.167 In a holding that paved the way for many
other decisions that followed, the court concluded that the
government’s review of the e-mail messages on the confiscated
computer did not violate the Federal Wiretap Act, as amended
to include electronic communications, because that statute
proscribes only “intercept[ion]” that is “contemporaneous
with . . . transmission.”168 Notwithstanding that the plaintiffs
had not yet retrieved some of the subject messages, no such
interception occurred, because the messages were already in
storage—the “transmission” of them, as contemplated by the
Wiretap Act, had already transpired.169
The interpretation of the Wiretap Act and SCA offered by
the court in Steve Jackson Games informed decisions of
numerous courts that confronted similar statutory claims in
the workplace setting in the years that followed. For example,
in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on Steve Jackson Games
for guidance and adopted similar reasoning in rejecting the
plaintiff-employee’s Wiretap Act/ECPA claim.170 Plaintiff
Konop, an airline pilot for defendant Hawaiian Airlines,
created a website on which he posted criticisms of defendant,
its officers, and the Air Line Pilots Association union.171 Konop
limited access to the website by requiring visitors to log in with
a user name and password, and he provided login credentials

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
2002).
171.

Id. at 459–60.
Id. at 460.
See id. at 460–63.
Id. at 460, 461–63.
Id.
See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876–79 (9th Cir.
Id. at 872.
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only to pilots and other employees of Hawaiian.172 His plan to
keep the site secret from management officials was foiled,
though, when a vice president obtained login credentials from a
willing employee and logged in multiple times to view Konop’s
content.173 Upon learning of the vice president’s access, Konop
filed suit, alleging, among other things, violations of the federal
Wiretap Act and the SCA.174 The district court granted
summary judgment to defendant, and Konop appealed.175
Addressing first the Wiretap Act claim, the Ninth Circuit
on appeal readily concluded that Konop’s website posts
constituted “electronic communication” within the meaning of
the statute, but nevertheless upheld the dismissal of that claim
on grounds no unlawful “interception” occurred.176 In reaching
its conclusion, the court relied heavily on the interpretation of
the Act offered in Steve Jackson Games.177 Specifically, the
Konop court found persuasive the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion
that the ECPA amendment retained stored communications
within the definition of wire communications but omitted them
from the definition of electronic communications.178 As such,
the statute elicited a narrow interpretation, by which electronic
communications deserve protection only when in transit, and
not while in storage.179 Because Hawaiian viewed posts on
Konop’s website only when in storage, and not in transmission,
his Wiretap Act claim failed.180
Konop’s SCA claim, however, fared better. The district
court had likewise granted summary judgment on the claim
under the SCA, reasoning that although the SCA (not
surprisingly) protects communications in storage and not just
in transmission, the statutory exemption for access authorized
by a “user” of the subject service applied, rendering Hawaiian’s
access lawful.181 Because the employees who provided login
credentials to the Hawaiian vice president were deemed
“users,” the district court reasoned that their involvement
172. Id.
173. Id. at 872–73.
174. Id. at 873.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 876–77, 879.
177. Id. at 876–77.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 877–78.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 879–80 (referring to the term of art “user” from 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701(c)(2) (2000)).
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saved Hawaiian’s conduct under the exemption, and Konop’s
SCA claim failed.182 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed.183
The statute defines a “user” as one who both uses the service
and is duly authorized to do so.184 But because the district
court never made any findings as to whether the employees
who provided their login credentials had ever actually used the
website, the district court’s ruling was flawed.185 The Ninth
Circuit therefore reversed entry of summary judgment on the
SCA claim.186
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., likewise
adopted the reasoning of Steve Jackson Games, according a
narrow interpretation to the ECPA so as to protect against only
interceptions of electronic communications that occur in
transmission.187 Defendant Nationwide terminated plaintiff
Fraser’s employment as an insurance agent after searching his
e-mail to ascertain the veracity of allegations that he was
revealing company secrets to its competitors.188 He
subsequently sued in federal district court, alleging that
Nationwide violated the ECPA when it searched his e-mail.189
The court relied directly on Steve Jackson Games and Konop in
affirming the rejection of Fraser’s claim under Title I of the
ECPA, adopting the same rationale to conclude that an
employer’s review of e-mail on its own server, even if without
the sender/recipient-employee’s permission, does not constitute
unlawful interception within the meaning of the statute
because the subject communications are no longer in transit,
but rather are already in storage.190 Furthermore, the court
likewise rejected Fraser’s claim under Title II of the ECPA (the
182. Id. at 880.
183. Id.
184. Id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2)).
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113–14 (3d Cir.
2003).
188. Id. at 110.
189. Id. He also brought claims for wrongful discharge, breach of contract,
conversion, and invasion of privacy, but those claims are not relevant to this
discussion of the federal statutory provisions. Id. at 110–11. The court
affirmed dismissal of his conversion and invasion of privacy claims on
procedural grounds, finding that the assertion of them by amendment was a
mere dilatory tactic, id. at 116–17, and the court upheld rejection of his
wrongful termination claim. Id. at 112–13.
190. Id. at 113–14.

982

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

SCA) on grounds that the “provider” exemption of the statute
applied and protected the employer-provider’s review of the
employee’s stored messages.191 In very short order, the Third
Circuit, following the trend well established by the pioneer
courts that came before it, rejected wholesale the plaintiffemployee’s attempt to invoke federal statutory protections,
affirming in the process the employer’s unfettered right to
access any of the employee’s electronic communications.192
C. EXTRACTING THE THEME
Although the facts and circumstances underlying each of
these “early” technology-related workplace privacy cases
differs, a persistent theme binds them together. In each and
every one of these cases, the court took what might be
described as an “easy way out,” adhering to traditional notions
of privacy and elementary conceptions of technologies that
evolve faster than the wheels of justice can turn. In other
words, shifting paradigms in workplace norms forged ahead in
an effort to keep pace with the rapid changes in workplace
technologies, but the courts’ earliest decisions reflect a
reluctance to keep pace.
The courts’ decisions in the earliest of these workplace
privacy cases lay a firm foundation for the theme for the others
that followed. As the trailblazers, the California Court of
Appeals in Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp.193 and the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.194 both embody trepidation at
confronting unfamiliar media and adhere to traditional notions
of privacy and elementary conceptions of technology in
adjudicating the employees’ rights. In Bourke, the employees
attempted to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy
based on their right to restrict access to their work e-mail
accounts via password-protection, but the court rejected those
contentions without explanation, holding that regardless of
their subjective understandings, their expectations of privacy

191. Id. at 114–15.
192. Id. at 113–15.
193. Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26,
1993), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_v_Nissan.html; see
supra notes 27–44 and accompanying text (discussing Bourke).
194. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see supra
notes 45–82 and accompanying text (discussing Smyth).
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were not objectively reasonable.195 Similarly, the court in
Smyth rejected the plaintiff’s privacy claims after his employer
reviewed e-mail on his company account.196 Even though the
employer had assured him repeatedly that all e-mail
communications were confidential and could not be used as
grounds for termination or disciplinary action, the court
nevertheless found, quite unequivocally, that any expectation
of privacy he may have had in the e-mail messages was
unreasonable and upheld his termination based on their
content.197 Indeed, the court in Smyth went so far as to declare
boldly that, with respect to voluntary messages sent over a
company e-mail system, “[w]e find no privacy interests in such
communications.”198 In both of these earliest cases, then, the
court not only gave short shrift to the plaintiffs’ claims of
privacy in e-mail communication, but it also did so in the face
of employer assurances to the contrary and with little analysis
to support its conclusions. Thus, these earliest privacy cases
together suggest that the first courts to confront privacy claims
in the context of workplace technologies had little interest in
delving into either the evolving media or the potential for
shifting social norms and instead disposed of the claims quickly
and without regard to the employees’ subjective expectations.
The next major case to come along, McLaren v. Microsoft
Corp., follows Smyth and, by distinguishing the traditional
workplace privacy theories reflected in K-Mart Corp. v.
Trotti,199 shows remarkable reluctance to extend privacy rights
recognized in those traditional (physical) settings to modern
technologies.200 Because the court in McLaren offers a bit more
insight in the form of reasoning, its decision affords more fertile
ground for critique than its precursors. The court’s reasoning
is, however, questionable. For example, the court distinguishes
McLaren’s e-mail from Trotti’s locker on grounds the locker is
discrete and separate, while an e-mail inbox is not.201 Because
195. Bourke, No. B068705.
196. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100–01.
197. Id. at 99–101.
198. Id. at 101.
199. K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636–38 (Tex. App. 1984); see
supra notes 101–12 and accompanying text (discussing Trotti and comparing
that case with McLaren).
200. McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05–97–00824, 1999 WL 339015, at *4
(Tex. App. May 28, 1999); see supra notes 84–112 and accompanying text
(discussing McLaren).
201. McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *4.
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e-mail messages must cross the threshold of the employer’s
system before transfer to personal folders became possible, the
court reasoned, those messages were not private by their very
nature.202 By contrast, the locker afforded Trotti a separate and
distinct place to store her “tangible, personal belongings.”203
The court’s distinction here reveals a fallacy of reasoning. In
order for the contents of Trotti’s locker to become in storage
there, those personal belongings, not unlike McLaren’s e-mail
messages, would of necessity enter the employer’s domain. The
items stored in the locker did not appear there magically; Trotti
placed them there only after carrying them into and through
the threshold of the employer’s building.
The McLaren court’s approach also defies logic based on
common lay understandings of how e-mail systems work. The
court distinguished Trotti on the grounds that K-Mart provided
the locker “for the specific purpose of storing personal
belongings, not work items.”204 By contrast, the court reasoned,
Microsoft provided McLaren’s e-mail “so that he could perform
the functions of his job.”205 As such, “the e-mail messages
contained on the company computer were not McLaren’s
personal property, but were merely an inherent part of the
office environment.”206 Again, the court’s reasoning is flawed. It
does not reflect the reality of electronic communications to
assume that a worker will not make personal use of “personal
folders” provided on the company’s e-mail system, especially
when the system invites the user to create a password to
protect their contents.
One possible explanation for the flawed nature of the
court’s analysis in McLaren is that the court simply did not
(indeed, perhaps even could not) understand the nature or the
typical use of the technology at issue. While it certainly
remains true that employers provide employees with e-mail
accounts and networked computers from which to access them
in order to enable performance of the employer’s work, it is not
consistent with reality to assume that, as a result, no personal
use of the e-mail system occurs.207 Whether the employer
permits such use is a separate question, but the point remains
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Muhl, supra note 44, at 36.
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true that the employee can (indeed, will) send and receive
personal messages on a company-provided e-mail system.208
Once that occurs, the employee is likely to store some or all of
those messages in folders intended for that purpose. This is
especially so where, as in McLaren, the e-mail system not only
permits the establishment of “personal folders” but also enables
the user to create his own password to protect them.
The courts that followed the trail blazed by Bourke, Smyth,
and McLaren appeared quite content to stick to the same path,
adhering to traditional notions of workplace privacy and
refusing all invitations to extend any privacy protections to
emerging technologies. The court in Garrity v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co. not only followed the lead of the
precursor decisions, but it did so, at least with respect to the
plaintiffs’ common-law claims, by adopting wholesale their
reasoning.209 Indeed, the Garrity court offered very little in the
way of its own original analysis, citing instead to Smyth and
McLaren, and then leaping to the conclusion that the plaintiffs
could not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
company e-mail accounts.210 Like the precedents it followed,
the Garrity court recognized that the employer had both
expressly and impliedly, through its actions, indicated that it
would not inspect employee e-mail (notwithstanding a
reservation of rights to the contrary), but nevertheless refused
to accord any common-law privacy rights to the employee
plaintiffs.211
The Garrity court also refused to break any new ground in
employee privacy under the statutes the plaintiffs had invoked.
As to the statutory claims, it is difficult to say whether the
refusal to recognize employee privacy in workplace electronic
communications stemmed from a deep-seated reluctance to do
so as a general matter, or instead was an inevitable conclusion
in light of the underlying source laws—the antiquated statutes
that had not kept pace with the evolving technologies. In that
respect, Garrity and the other principal statutory cases from
208. See id.
209. Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002); see supra notes 113–
30 and accompanying text (discussing Garrity).
210. See Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *1–2.
211. Id. at *2 (“Even if plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their work e-mail, defendant’s legitimate business interest in protecting its
employees from harassment in the workplace would likely trump plaintiffs’
privacy interests.”).
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the “early” era,212 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,213 and
Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,214 are all cut from
the same cloth. Though Garrity addressed state statutes, while
the claims in Konop and Fraser invoked federal law, the courts’
treatment of those claims and interpretation of the similar
statutes fall directly in line with one another.215 In each of
those cases, the court followed the lead of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games
v. U.S. Secret Service,216 interpreting the wiretap statute
invoked by the plaintiff narrowly so as not to reach the
employer’s review of the employee’s e-mail on grounds the
messages in the employee’s inbox (or e-mail folders, as the case
may be), could not be “intercepted” within the meaning of the
subject statute, because such messages were no longer “in
transmission.”217
Whatever reticence the courts in those early statutory
cases might have felt when it came to charting new territory in
employee workplace privacy, the statutes on which the
plaintiffs were forced (absent any more readily applicable
remedy) to rely likely obviated the results those courts reached,
because the statutes themselves were highly antiquated and
thus ill-equipped to address the needs of the rapidly evolving
workplace. Indeed, in each of the subject cases, the plaintiffs
attempted to carve out protections for communications made in
a form that not only did not exist but indeed could not have
been contemplated when the statutes themselves were enacted.
Both the Massachusetts Wiretap Act invoked by the Garrity
plaintiffs, and the Federal Wiretap Act relied upon by the
plaintiffs in Konop and Fraser, had their origins in the war
waged against organized crime in the 1960s.218 As such, the
212. See supra Part I.A–B (identifying and discussing cases from the 1990s
and early 2000s as comprising “early” workplace technology cases).
213. 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); see supra notes 170–86 and
accompanying text (discussing Konop).
214. 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003); see supra notes 187–92 and accompanying
text (discussing Fraser).
215. Compare Garrity, 2002 WL 974676, at *3 (addressing the state
wiretap statute), with Konop, 302 F.3d at 874–80 (addressing the federal
wiretap statute), and Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113–15 (same).
216. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); see supra notes 151–69 and accompanying
text (discussing Steve Jackson Games).
217. Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113–14; Konop, 302 F.3d at 876–79; Garrity, 302
F.3d at *3.
218. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1–3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3556 (discussing origins of the Wiretap Act as part of the Omnibus
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statutes addressed only those forms of communication that
existed at the time, focusing on the telephone.219 Congress
recognized these shortcomings and amended the federal statute
in 1986 in an attempt to address modern technological
advances, extending its protections to encompass “electronic”
communications in addition to wire and oral ones, and covering
not only such communications “in transmission” but also in
storage.220 In crafting the revised protections, Congress
recognized the rapid evolution of the underlying technology,
emphasizing the advent of communications via computer,
computer networks, and private telephone lines.221 But in the

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968); Garrity, 302 F.3d at *3
(indicating that the Massachusetts Wiretap Act is similar in purpose to its
federal counterpart).
219. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556
(“[The Wiretap Act’s] regimen for protecting the privacy of voice
communications is expressly limited to the unauthorized aural interception of
wire or oral communications. It only applies where the contents of a
communication can be overheard and understood by the human ear.
Furthermore, [it] applies only to interceptions of communications sent via
common carriers.” (citation omitted)).
220. Konop, 302 F.3d at 874 (discussing the 1986 amendment of the
Wiretap Act to encompass interception and storage of electronic
communications).
221. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555–
57. The Senate Report described well the advancements and the concomitant
need for statutory revision:
Today we have large-scale electronic mail operations, computerto-computer data transmissions, cellular and cordless telephones,
paging devices, and video teleconferencing. A phone call can be
carried by wire, by microwave or fiber optics. It can be transmitted in
the form of digitized voice, data or video. Since the divestiture of
AT&T and deregulation, many different companies, not just common
carriers, offer a wide variety of telephone and other communications
services. It does not make sense that a phone call transmitted via
common carrier is protected by the current federal wiretap statute,
while the same phone call transmitted via a private telephone
network such as those used by many major U.S. corporations today,
would not be covered by the statute.
These tremendous advances in telecommunications and
computer technologies have carried with them comparable
technological advances in surveillance devices and techniques.
Electronic hardware making it possible for overzealous law
enforcement agencies, industrial spies and private parties to intercept
the personal or proprietary communications of others are readily
available in the American market today.
Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act addresses
the interception of wire, oral and electronic communications. It
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world of technology and electronic communications, what is
“modern” one day is often antiquated the next. As such, the
statutory revisions Congress made in 1986 were effectively
outdated almost before they became effective, and certainly
have not kept pace with the rapid and extensive changes that
have occurred in the intervening quarter century.222 Indeed,
the statutes remain today in effectively the same form that
they existed after the 1986 amendments.223 As the Konop court
explained well, the statutes are therefore wholly inadequate
when it comes to redressing modern technological
advancements:
As we have previously observed, the intersection of [the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act and the Stored Communications Act,
both enacted as revisions to the Wiretap Act] is a complex, often
convoluted, area of the law. In the present case, the difficulty is
compounded by the fact that the ECPA was written prior to the
advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the
existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms
of communication like Konop’s secure website. Courts have
struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology within
the confines of this statutory framework, often with unsatisfying
results. We observe that until Congress brings the laws in line with
modern technology, protection of the Internet and websites such as
Konop’s will remain a confusing and uncertain area of the law.224

Given these obvious inadequacies, it should come as no
surprise that plaintiffs attempting to carve out protections in
light of modern technologies have almost uniformly failed when
attempting to rely on the antiquities of the statutory regime.
As the Konop court forthrightly recognized—and then over a
decade ago—the statutes will remain a wholly inadequate
source of guidance when it comes to the rights and
responsibilities of employees and employers in the modern
workplace, at least until Congress succeeds in revising the laws
to meet the rapidly evolving technologies.225 While Congress

amends existing chapter 119 of title 18 to bring it in line with
technological developments and changes in the structure of the
telecommunications industry.
Id.
222. See Security and Surveillance, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.,
https://www.cdt.org/issue/wiretap-ecpa (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (discussing
the impact of cloud storage and location tracking for mobile devices).
223. See id.
224. Konop, 302 F.3d at 874 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
225. See id.
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has yet to confront the problem head on, though, new avenues
may nevertheless be emerging.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WORKER PRIVACY
Change is afoot. In the latter part of the new millennium’s
first decade, the law of worker privacy began what appears to
be a modern evolution, pacing behind but nevertheless
reflective of shifting social norms as technology growth
burgeoned, and its use in and beyond the workplace became
pervasive. The evolution is far from complete, and remains in a
state of vulnerable infancy. Its trajectory is likely to change
many times in the decades to come. Yet, the trends reflected in
the law are unmistakable, and suggest that as the use of
technology becomes increasingly widespread, the law may
follow in recognizing the need for some privacy protections that
did not previously exist.226
This Part discusses recent developments in the law
concerning employee privacy in workplace technologies, and
suggests that the trend appears to be favoring broader
recognition of employee privacy in at least those uses of
technology that are becoming the most widely accepted.
Venturing into uncharted territory, a few progressive courts led
the way by acknowledging for the first time that employees
may reasonably expect privacy in workplace technologies.227
Following that trend, some courts have found new paths
around antiquated statutes to carve out new rights, while state
legislatures have begun enacting new laws to protect their
constituents in the modernizing world.228 These common-law
and statutory trends are also bleeding over into the realm of
administrative law, as agencies have followed suit by
recognizing that employees may retain privacy rights to protect
their online social networking, even when it directly impacts
the workplace.229 This section discusses each of these
226. See infra Part II.A.1.
227. See infra Part II.A.1.
228. See, e.g., Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords,
CONF.
ST.
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/
NAT’L
telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-socialmedia-passwords-2013.aspx (last updated Mar. 21, 2014) (discussing pending
state legislation to prevent employers from requiring access to personal social
media accounts).
229. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Company Accused of Firing Over
Facebook Post, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/
business/09facebook.html?_r=0 (discussing a complaint brought by the
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developments in turn and reveals in the process a distinct
trend away from the reluctance and trepidation of the prior
generation, in favor of broader privacy rights for the high-tech
workforce.
A. THE COMMON-LAW TRAILBLAZERS
The evolution of workplace privacy rights in emerging
technologies began when a few trailblazing judges became the
first to recognize that employees may reasonably expect privacy
in e-mail sent over or accessed on company equipment.
Remarkably, some of these judges recognized such privacy
expectations even in the face of published company policies
attempting to defeat those very expectancies. As the first, or at
least foremost, courts to balk the firmly entrenched disdain for
worker privacy in emerging technologies that permeated the
law of the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, their
decisions paved the path for further evolution that has
indubitably begun but has yet to reach fruition. The cases
discussed below, while not the only ones that might fall into
this category, typify and exemplify the shifting norms of the
modern era.
1. State and Federal Court Decisions According Broader
Common-Law Privacy Rights
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York led the way into the modern era of workplace
privacy by condoning employee privacy claims in e-mail
messages accessed on company equipment, notwithstanding
the employer’s policy attempting to defeat any expectation of
privacy.230 Notably, the context for that court’s 2008 decision in
Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp departed
from the traditional model by which the earlier privacy cases
came to the attention of the courts. The privacy issue in Pure
Power Boot Camp arose not as the central tenet of the
plaintiffs’ claims, as it had in the wrongful discharge and
invasion of privacy cases of the “early” era,231 but instead as a
National Labor Relations Board on behalf of an employee fired after
complaining about her boss on her Facebook account).
230. See Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
231. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing early cases involving claims to worker
privacy in new technologies, such as Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp. (rejecting
claims for common-law and constitutional invasion of privacy), and Smyth v.
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peripheral matter raised via an evidentiary objection.232
Indeed, the central claims in that case did not involve worker
privacy at all. Instead, the plaintiff Pure Power Boot Camp
(PPBC), which formerly employed the individual defendants,
sued them and the competing fitness center (defendant Warrior
Fitness Boot Camp) they had recently opened, bringing various
claims for breach of restrictive covenants, breach of fiduciary
duties, and infringement of trademarks, trade dress, and
copyrights.233 The plaintiffs attempted to rely in the course of
the litigation on thirty-four e-mail messages obtained by PPBC
representatives from an individual defendant’s e-mail accounts,
but the defendants objected on privacy grounds.234
The context in which the privacy issue arose in Pure Power
Boot Camp made it a good candidate to begin shifting the tide
away from reluctance and toward acceptance of employee
privacy in e-mail. First, as explained above, the issue arose as a
peripheral evidentiary matter and not as the foundation of the
plaintiffs’ claims. As such, at least arguably, the court could
approach the privacy law aspect somewhat more aggressively,
without having to depart blatantly from established precedents
or disregard principles of stare decisis. Moreover, the factual
context made it a persuasive case for recognition of employee
privacy rights because, unlike in many of the “early era”
cases,235 it was not clear that the subject employee e-mails had
been created on employer equipment or during the employee’s
working hours.236 PPBC gained access to the subject e-mail
messages, which were sent from the defendant’s personal webbased e-mail accounts (Gmail.com, Hotmail.com, and
warriorfitnessbootcamp.com, an account on his new employer’s
domain), after he left his Hotmail username and password
stored on PPBC’s computers.237 Because he used the same

Pillsbury Co. (dismissing a privacy-based claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy)).
232. Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 551–52.
235. See supra Part I.A (discussing early cases raising issues pertaining to
employee privacy in workplace technologies).
236. See Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 553 n.3 (“[Defendant]
Fell makes a general claim that he never did any work related to WFBC while
he was at PPBC or on PPBC computers. However, he has not provided his
PPBC work schedule, so there is no way to confirm whether or not he was at
PPBC when he sent any of these e-mails.” (citation omitted)).
237. Id. at 552.
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password for his other e-mail accounts, PPBC was able to
access those accounts as well.238 Thus, the employee had used
his employer’s computer to access his personal e-mail at one
time, but there was otherwise no proof that he used company
equipment to create the subject messages on a later date, or
that he did so while he was working.239 Chiefly relying on these
facts, the court concluded that the defendant reasonably
expected privacy in the e-mail messages he sent, received, and
stored on his personal accounts, even though he had not only
accessed those accounts on employer equipment but had also
saved his password there, enabling one-click account entry by
anyone who could turn on the computer.240 What is more, the
court recognized these privacy rights, in the face of an
employer policy that expressly negated any privacy rights or
expectations in any e-mail that passed through the company’s
computer system.241
The reduced connection in Pure Power Boot Camp between
the e-mail messages in which the (here, former) employee
claimed privacy, on the one hand, and the employer’s
workplace, on the other, opened the door for the court to confer
greater privacy-based protection than had been recognized in
the technology-based privacy cases that preceded it.242 And yet,
the principles that the court announced and the analytical
approach it took leave room for courts to follow its lead in
subsequent cases, expanding the privacy rights that the Pure
Power Boot Camp court initially pronounced. Of chief
importance in that regard is the fact that the court recognized
privacy rights in the face of an employer policy attempting to

238. Id.
239. Id. at 553.
240. Id. at 560–61.
241. See id. at 552–53. Specifically, the PPBC Employee Handbook policy
concerning e-mail access on company computers stated:
[E]-mail users have no right of personal privacy in any matter stored
in, created on, received from, or sent through or over the system. This
includes the use of personal e-mail accounts on Company equipment.
The Company, in its discretion as owner of the E-Mail system,
reserves the right to review, monitor, access, retrieve, and delete any
matter stored in, created on, received from, or sent through the
system, for any reason, without the permission of any system user,
and without notice.
Id.
242. See id. at 560–61.
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defeat any such expectation or claim.243 In reaching that
conclusion, the court distinguished the facts of the case before
it from those in which courts had relied directly on similar
policies to reject employee privacy claims, on grounds the
PPBC employee had not actually stored any of the subject email messages on company equipment and likely had not even
sent the messages from, or received them on, employer
equipment.244 Yet, the employee had not only accessed his
personal account on PPBC’s computer, but he had also gone so
far as to store his password there as well, leaving the door wide
open to any person who powered it on.245 The court dismissed
these facts as essentially irrelevant, though, holding that
saving the password did not confer implied consent to access
the account’s contents, and that his privacy expectation in the
personal account therefore remained intact.246 As such, the
Pure Power Boot Camp decision charts new territory, by
comparison to the “early era” cases discussed above, in that it
upholds an employee’s right to privacy in the face of a policy
attempting to directly defeat the same, and when the employee
had himself essentially provided the employer the “key” to his
account by saving his password on company equipment.247
Moreover, the decision also sets a strong precedent concerning
the strength of privacy claims in the context of technologies
established personally by the employee (here, personal webbased e-mail accounts), even when the employee accesses those
technologies on the employer’s equipment or network, and even
where the employee provides sufficient information to allow the
employer ready access.
Subsequent courts addressing employee privacy claims in
similar yet distinct contexts seemed to follow the lead of the
Pure Power Boot Camp court in expanding common law
protections of employees’ technology-based privacy rights, even
if they did not rely on that case expressly. For example, in
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group, the court held that the
plaintiff-employees had proffered sufficient evidence to reach a
jury on their claims that the employer invaded reasonably

243. See id. at 552–53, 559–62.
244. Id. at 560.
245. Id. at 552.
246. Id. at 561.
247. See id. (employing a house-key analogy in explaining that storing a
password on a computer is equivalent to leaving a key on a doorstep, which
does not confer consent to entry).
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expected privacy when it accessed a website created by and for
the employees for the purpose of “vent[ing] about . . . work
without any outside eyes spying in on us.”248 The plaintiffs,
former employees of the defendant company that operated a
Houston’s restaurant where they had worked, were discharged
after management discovered postings on an employee-run
Myspace.com page that management found “offensive” as well
as contradictory to the restaurant’s core values of
“professionalism, positive mental attitude, aim to please
approach, and teamwork.”249 The plaintiffs had set up the page
as a forum in which employees could share frustrations about
their jobs.250 Management gained access to the page when one
of the member-employees shared her password with them.251
After the company terminated their employment due to the
offensive content found on the Myspace.com page, the plaintiffs
sued, bringing both statutory and common law claims.252
Unlike the predecessor plaintiffs of the earlier era, the
Houston’s plaintiffs received a warmer reception to their
privacy pleas. Indeed, not only did the plaintiffs’ privacy claims
survive an early motion to dismiss253—the stage at which
several of the early-era claims faltered254—but they even
triumphed over a motion for summary judgment, with the next
stop the proverbial plaintiffs’ promised land of a trial by jury.255
Specifically, four of plaintiffs’ claims, all with privacy
implications, survived defendant’s summary judgment motion:
statutory claims under the federal Stored Communications Act
and its state-law counterpart, a tort claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy premised on an alleged
248. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1
(D.N.J. July 25, 2008). The claims that survived defendant’s motion for
summary judgment consisted of alleged violations of the Stored
Communications Act and a state counterpart statute, a claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy based on an invasion of privacy, and a
common-law claim for the tort of invasion of privacy itself. See id. at *3–7.
249. Id. at *2.
250. See id. at *1.
251. Id.
252. Id. at *2.
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(dismissing plaintiff’s privacy claims after employer terminated plaintiff
employee for content of e-mail messages); see also supra notes 45–82 and
accompanying text (discussing Smyth and its resolution on a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)).
255. See Pietrylo, 2008 WL 6085437, at *3–7.
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invasion of privacy, and a tort claim for invasion of privacy
standing alone.256
As to the statutory claims, the court focused on the fact
that the employee who granted access to management by
sharing her password did so only out of concern for her job,
fearing that adverse employment action may be taken if she
did not comply.257 In light of her testimony that she felt
pressured into sharing her password in order to protect her job,
the court concluded that a genuine issue of fact existed
concerning whether her consent was voluntary.258 Suggesting
that consent offered only under duress would not constitute the
requisite authorization to afford a liability exemption under the
statutes, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.259 Thus, the court readily found an avenue by which
it could permit the plaintiffs’ claims to proceed.
The plaintiffs’ common-law claims met with similar
success, affording an even starker contrast to the fate of
comparable claims brought in the early era. First, quite unlike
the first courts to confront the issue, the Pietrylo court readily
concluded that “[a] right to privacy may be a source of ‘a clear
mandate of public policy’ that could support a claim for
wrongful termination.”260 Moreover, the court did not hesitate
in finding that the plaintiffs reasonably expected privacy in
their
“invitation-only
internet
discussion
space,”261
notwithstanding that the employees used the company logo to
label the page and gathered together there only because of
their workplace connection.262 Again relying on facts
concerning the conditions under which the managers gained
access to the site, the court concluded that a disputed issue of
material fact regarding authorization necessitated resolution
by trial.263 Similarly, the authorization issue precluded
summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ common-law invasion of
privacy claim, as well.264 And unlike the predecessor courts of
the earlier era, the Pietrylo court readily concluded that the

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See id. at *3–7.
See id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
See id.
See id. at *1.
See id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
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employees might have reasonably expected privacy in their
postings, even though the site existed on the World Wide Web,
because of the fact that the employees protected it with a
password.265 In that respect, the Pietrylo case stands in stark
contrast to the cases of the early era, in which courts tended to
swiftly reject employee privacy claims even as to messages sent
on individual employees’ e-mail accounts, which are at least
arguably more prone to expectations of privacy than postings to
a web site.266 What was wholly inadequate to survive an out-ofthe-gates motion to dismiss in the early era, became readily
sufficient to support the claim’s viability not only at the initial
stages but even all the way to trial.
The trajectory toward increasingly open reception to
employee privacy claims stemming from technology use
reached new heights in the 2010 New Jersey Supreme Court
case, Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.267 Perhaps most
notably, and consistent with the approach of other modern-era
courts, the Stengart court gave short shrift to the employer’s
policy unequivocally negating any expectation of privacy in
actions taken on company computer equipment.268 Instead, the
court dismissed the published policy as irrelevant because the
employee sent and received the subject e-mail messages via her
own personal, password-protected, web-based e-mail account,
even though she did so on the company’s equipment, as
expressly contemplated by the policy.269 Indeed, although the
context of the privacy issue in Stengart bore striking
similarities to that presented in the case decided just two years
earlier by the neighboring New York federal district court in
Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp,270 the

265. See id. Indeed, the court held that a genuine issue of material fact
existed concerning whether the employees reasonably expected privacy in
their web postings. Id.
266. See id.; see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing courts’ swift rejection of
employee privacy claims stemming from employers’ review of employee e-mail
messages).
267. See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
268. See id. at 657–58; see also Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness
Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting employer’s
claim that policy purporting to negate expectation of privacy was effective as
to e-mail messages sent on employee’s personal, password-protected, webbased e-mail account).
269. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 657.
270. See Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 552–53; supra notes
230–47 and accompanying text (discussing Pure Power Boot Camp).
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Stengart court arguably extended its recognition of privacy
rights even further.
As in Pure Power Boot Camp, the privacy issue in Stengart
did not form the foundation of the plaintiff’s lawsuit, but
instead arose out of a discovery dispute.271 The plaintiff,
Marina Stengart, sued her former employer, defendant LovingCare Agency, alleging constructive discharge, harassment, and
retaliation.272 After she filed suit, Loving Care hired a
computer forensic expert to mine data off the company laptop
she had used during her employment, and found a number of email messages exchanged between Stengart and her attorney
via her personal, password-protected, web-based e-mail
account.273 When Loving Care relied on those e-mail messages
during discovery, Stengart objected, asserting the attorneyclient privilege and seeking return of the e-mails.274
The trial court’s decision tracked more closely the
sentiments of the earlier era, triumphing employer prerogative
over employee rights, but the appellate courts found
otherwise.275 The company’s Electronic Communication Policy,
which carried the day at the trial court, purported to negate
any expectation of privacy in any use to which an employee
might put her company-issued equipment:
The company reserves and will exercise the right to review, audit,
intercept, access, and disclose all matters on the company’s media
systems and services at any time, with or without notice . . . . Email and voice mail messages, internet use and communication and
computer files are considered part of the company’s business and
client records. Such communications are not to be considered
private or personal to any individual employee.276

According to the trial court, because the policy expressly stated
that Internet communications on company equipment were
“not to be considered private or personal,” plaintiff Stengart
could not claim any protection—via the attorney-client
privilege or otherwise—of her e-mails sent on her laptop.277 The
court of appeals, and eventually the New Jersey Supreme
Court, however, disagreed.278 Reading the employer’s policy
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 655.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 657.
Id.
See id. at 655.
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narrowly in favor of employee rights, the appellate courts held
instead that Stengart retained an expectation of privacy in her
webmail communications, based primarily on its conclusion
that the employer’s policy did not address “personal [e-mail]
accounts.”279 Because she did not expect that the company
could and would access the personal webmail she sent on her
company laptop, she did not waive the attorney-client privilege
when she used that equipment to send the subject messages.280
As such, the Stengart court, consistent with other modern-era
decisions, stepped out from the bonds of employer prerogative
that led to broad application of electronic communication
policies in the early era, and readily concluded instead that
because the subject policy did not expressly describe the
employer’s ability to access any Internet usage on its own
equipment, the policy simply did not govern.281
2. Supreme Court Instruction—Or the Lack Thereof
Taken together, the cases discussed above—Pure Power
Boot Camp,282 Pietrylo,283 and Stengart284—though far from the
only decisions on the subject in recent years, represent well the
modern consensus and its trend away from the trepidation
reflected in decisions rendered in the earlier years of the
modern technological era. In each of those three representative
cases, the court employed traditional common law doctrine
concerning employees’ expectations of privacy, but departed
279. See id. at 657.
280. See id. at 663–65.
281. See id. The Stengart court also discussed other similar decisions that
might fairly be grouped along with it as representative of the trend toward
increasing recognition of employee privacy rights in the modern era. See, e.g.,
In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 259 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding that because employer policy purporting to ban personal use of e-mail
and allowing monitoring was “equivocal,” employee could claim attorney-client
privilege in e-mail messages exchanged with lawyer over company e-mail
system); Memorandum and Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel at *3, Nat’l
Econ. Research Assocs., Inc. v. Evans, 2006 WL 2440008 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Aug. 3, 2006) (No. 04-2618-BLS2) (finding that employee had reasonable
expectation of privacy in webmail messages sent on company computer
because employer’s Internet communications policy “did not expressly declare
that it would monitor the content of Internet communications”).
282. Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp.
2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see supra notes 230–47 and accompanying text.
283. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1
(D.N.J. July 25, 2008); see supra notes 248–66 and accompanying text.
284. Stengart, 990 A.2d 650; see supra notes 267–81 and accompanying
text.
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from the reluctant ways of the predecessor courts by narrowly
interpreting employer monitoring policies or otherwise finding
that employee privacy rights prevailed notwithstanding
employers’ attempts to defeat them.285 These representative
cases paint a thorough picture of the shifting norms that
underlie the modern era, but a discussion of cases addressing
the courts’ approach to common-law notions of privacy
expectations would not be complete without at least mentioning
the United States Supreme Court’s dabbling in this arena. And
while the High Court’s decisions that address reasonable
expectations of privacy in the workplace typically arise in the
context of constitutional questions relevant only in the public
workplace—a body of law that lies only at the periphery of this
Article—its instruction is nevertheless pertinent, as other
courts interpreting the common law often look to the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in the constitutional setting for
guidance.286
The Supreme Court’s body of law assessing employee
privacy in the public workplace setting is relatively rich both in
history and in depth, but it is the Court’s 2010 decision in City
of Ontario v. Quon that is most relevant here.287 The Court’s
decision in Quon—or, perhaps more accurately, its refusal to
reach any decision about privacy expectations—failed to
provide the instruction that many hoped it would afford, but is
nevertheless not entirely useless. Indeed, the Court’s
discussion of privacy expectations might best be characterized
as paving the way for courts to follow the lead of those
discussed above in taking a more aggressive, and progressive,
approach to issues of employee workplace privacy in the
technological era.
Quon is especially pertinent here because it was the first
Supreme Court case to address employee privacy rights in
workplace technologies. Jeff Quon, a police officer and SWAT
Team member in the city of Ontario, California, sued the City
alleging constitutional violations after City officials reviewed

285. See, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
286. See, e.g., Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 897–99
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing, at length, case law on workplace privacy
rights, dismissing that body of law as not directly relevant to the private
setting, but proceeding to apply principles announced in those cases to assess
plaintiff’s privacy claims).
287. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
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text messages sent and received on his City-issued pager.288
Prior to issuing the employee pagers, the City announced a
“Computer Usage, Internet, and E-mail Policy,” reserving the
City’s right to monitor “all network activity” and specifying
that “[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or
confidentiality when using these resources.”289 Although the
policy did not apply on its face to text messages, the City
announced on several occasions that it would accord the same
treatment to text messages as it did to e-mail and other
network usages.290 In addition, a supervisor expressly told
Quon “that messages sent on the pagers were ‘considered email and could be audited,’” though that same supervisor also
went on to explain that “it was not his intent to audit [an]
employee’s text messages to see if the overage [was] due to
work related transmissions.”291 When Quon regularly exceeded
the monthly character limitation on his text messaging plan,
his superiors in the police department attempted to ascertain
whether the overages warranted an increase in his character
allotment.292 In order to make that determination, the
department obtained text-message transcripts from Arch
Wireless, the third-party service provider, and reviewed them
for content.293 In an apparent effort to preserve Quon’s privacy,
the officer consulted Quon’s work schedule and redacted any
messages sent during non-working hours, but nevertheless
found that the majority of messages sent and received on
Quon’s pager, even during work hours, did not pertain to his
job.294 The City disciplined Quon as a result of these
findings.295
Of central significance here is the Court’s discussion of
Quon’s privacy expectations in this setting, which arose as an
288. See id. at 750–53.
289. Id. at 751.
290. See id. at 751–52.
291. Id. at 752.
292. See id. at 752.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 753. The officer’s report noted that:
Quon sent or received 456 messages during work hours in the month
of August 2002, of which no more than 57 were work related; he sent
as many as 80 messages during a single day at work; and on an
average workday, Quon sent or received 28 messages, of which only 3
were related to police business.
Id.
295. Id.
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issue as part of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the City
violated his constitutional protections against unlawful
searches under the Fourth Amendment.296 The Court’s
precedents addressing employee privacy in the public
workplace had not yielded a consensus rule concerning either
the requisite proof to make out a claim, or the parameters of
reasonable privacy expectations pertinent thereto.297 Instead,
the Court’s only precedents had failed to garner support of a
sufficient majority of justices to elicit a majority rule.298 In
particular, the 1987 decision in O’Connor v. Ortega, although
the seminal authority on the privacy rights of public employees
under the Fourth Amendment, emerged as only a plurality
opinion.299 A four-justice plurality, led by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, favored a two-step process for the assessment of
public employees’ Fourth Amendment rights.300 According to
the plurality, a court must first consider “‘[t]he operational
realities of the workplace’ in order to determine whether an
employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated. On this
view, ‘the question whether an employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case
basis.’”301 If such an expectation can reasonably be found, then,
according to the plurality, a court should proceed to determine
whether an employer’s intrusion on that expectation is
reasonable under the circumstances.302 This two-part test did
not, however, become the definitive rule, because it failed to
garner support from a majority of justices. The other view,
espoused and articulated by Justice Antonin Scalia, “would
have dispensed with an inquiry into ‘operational realities’ and
would conclude ‘that offices of government employees . . . are
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general

296. Id. Quon also brought claims under the Stored Communications Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006), as well as California state law, but those
claims were not before the Supreme Court in this case and otherwise lie
beyond the scope of this Article due to the public employment setting in which
the case arose and the existence of third-party service provider Arch Wireless
as a defendant in the case as originally filed. Id. at 753.
297. See id. at 757 (explaining lack of clarity concerning a “threshold test
for determining the scope of an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights”).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 756–57 (discussing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)).
300. Id. at 756.
301. Id. at 756–57 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717–18) (citation
omitted).
302. Id. at 757 (discussing O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26).
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matter.”303 Justice Scalia would then have proceeded directly to
an assessment of the reasonableness of the search itself, with
the instruction “that government searches to retrieve workrelated materials or to investigate violations of workplace
rules—searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and
normal in the private-employer context—do not violate the
Fourth Amendment.”304 Thus, while the plurality would have
conducted a threshold inquiry into whether the employee
reasonably expected privacy, Justice Scalia would assume that
expectation and consider only whether the search was
reasonable, tapping into private-workplace norms in making
that assessment.
In the nearly quarter century that passed between
O’Connor and the Court’s grant of certiorari in Quon, the lower
courts floundered in the absence of a majority rule concerning
the governing framework.305 Many adopted the plurality
approach, thereby necessitating inquiry into the employee’s
privacy expectations.306 Whether the “right” approach or not,
the plurality’s two-part test has the advantage of fostering
development of the law concerning the reasonableness of
employee privacy expectations which, although not directly
binding in common-law cases, is nevertheless instructive. Thus,
many hoped that when the Supreme Court granted review of
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Quon, it would not only answer
the proof-structure question left open after Ortega, but would
also provide some of that very sort of instruction concerning
employee privacy in the age of technology.307
303. Id. (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
304. Id. (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
305. See, e.g., Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1203–04 (7th Cir. 1989)
(attempting to discern governing rule of law from O’Connor in light of
plurality opinion); Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328,
1333–34 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing splintered opinions in O’Connor).
306. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating
that Justice O’Connor’s approach from the O’Connor plurality opinion
controls); Shields, 874 F.2d at 1203 (same); Schowengerdt, 823 F.2d at 1334
(same).
307. See David S. Barnhill, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications:
Another Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 622
(2010) (discussing expectantly that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari
to review Ninth Circuit’s decision in Quon and stating that “[t]his is an
opportunity for the Court to speak directly on the privacy protections available
for electronic communications delivered through third parties”); Clifford S.
Fishman, Electronic Privacy in the Government Workplace and City of
Ontario, California v. Quon: The Supreme Court Brought Forth a Mouse, 81
MISS. L.J. 1359, 1362–63 (2012) (“When the Court granted cert in
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Unfortunately, the speculators were disappointed.
Although the case did produce a majority opinion, it did not
resolve the open question concerning the proof framework
applicable to public employee Fourth Amendment cases.308
Instead, the Court dodged that question by concluding that the
search was reasonable, thereby obviating the need for inquiry
into whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy or
not.309 As such, “[t]he two O’Connor approaches—the plurality’s
and Justice Scalia’s—therefore lead to the same result.”310 No
answer emerged, and the lingering proof-framework question
remains open.
The Court’s failure to resolve the open proof-framework
question is disappointing, but what is even more troublesome,
at least for purposes of this Article, is the absence of any useful
guidance in the opinion about reasonable expectations of
privacy in workplace technologies. There was no need to
address that issue at all, given the majority’s conclusion that
the search was reasonable regardless of Quon’s expectations.311
Nevertheless, in the spirit of “instruct[ion],” the majority went
on to discuss whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the text messages on his pager.312 However, its
“instruction” fell far short of deserving that label. The most
instructive point that can be gleaned from the Court’s dictum is
that in assessing privacy expectations, workplace policies and
practices matter.313 That point, however, is far from novel.
Indeed, nearly every one of the cases discussed above
addressed the employer’s policy concerning technology use as
relevant to the employee’s privacy expectations, at least in
some respect.314 Beyond that point, the Court expressly refused
to delve any further, reciting the rapid evolution of technology
Quon . . . many scholars, judges, and practitioners hoped that the Quon
decision would clarify the uncertainties left over from O’Connor and resolve
new issues created by electronic communications technology. On the other
hand, some observers feared that the Court in Quon might issue a broad,
sweeping decision that could have a substantial, unforeseeable, and perhaps
unfortunate impact on emerging communications technologies. As it turned
out, Quon decided very little, and leaves the law more unsettled than it
previously was.”).
308. Quon, 560 U.S. at 757.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 758–59.
313. Id. at 758.
314. See, e.g., supra Parts I.A.1, II.A.1.

1004

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

as good reason to avoid broaching the topic of a legal response
to it.315 Indeed, the Court went on at some length here, taking
pains to make clear its trepidation about resolving questions
concerning privacy expectations in the face of rapidly shifting
social norms:
The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole
concept of privacy expectations in communications made on
electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The
judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in
society has become clear . . . .
....
. . . Cell phone and text message communications are so
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential
means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even selfidentification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of
privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices has made
them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees
who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can
purchase and pay for their own. And employer policies concerning
communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of
their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are
clearly communicated.316

Thus, the Court stated that it was loathe to dictate the
parameters of proper inquiry into privacy expectations in
workplace technologies, but it nevertheless proceeded to do
much of what it disclaimed. The Court identified a variety of
relevant factors, including the employer’s policies and
communications to employees, the pervasiveness of the subject
technologies, and society’s expectations about them at large,
but it did so without supplying any real parameters to guide
the inquiry.317 The result is therefore subjectivity and lack of
predictability.
The Court’s refusal to address privacy expectations on
grounds that it must proceed cautiously due to the rapid
evolution of the relevant technologies is somewhat ironic given
that the very technologies at stake—text messages sent via
paging devices—were heavily antiquated by the time the Court
rendered its decision. Justice Scalia, concurring in the
judgment, boldly chastised the majority for its timidity:
Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may
sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we

315. Quon, 560 U.S. at 759–60.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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have no choice. The Court’s implication . . . that where electronic
privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise
would (that is, less than the principle of law necessary to resolve
the case and guide private action)—or that we should hedge our
bets by concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque
opinions—is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-are-achangin’ is a feeble excuse for the disregard of duty.318

According to Justice Scalia, then, the majority went too far in
“instructing” about privacy expectations at all.319 Moreover, the
instruction itself elicited his negative response on grounds that
it will cause lower courts to flounder in their analysis of privacy
issues and reach erroneous results more often than not.320 As is
often the case, Justice Scalia’s point is best made by extracting
his very words:
Worse still, the digression is self-defeating. Despite the Court’s
insistence that it is agnostic about the proper test, lower courts will
likely read the Court’s self-described “instructive” expatiation on
how the O’Connor plurality’s approach would apply here (if it
applied) as a heavy-handed hint about how they should proceed.
Litigants will do likewise, using the threshold question whether
the Fourth Amendment is even implicated as a basis for
bombarding lower courts with arguments about employer policies,
how they were communicated, and whether they were authorized,
as well as the latest trends in employees’ use of electronic media.
In short, in saying why it is not saying more, the Court says much
more than it should.321

Given the ambiguity in the non-exhaustive list of relevant
considerations that the majority offered in its dictum, Justice
Scalia’s criticisms have some resonance. As discussed in Part
III below, his suggestion that any standard necessitating a
subjective inquiry into the norms surrounding rapidly evolving
technologies makes some sense, and may imply a route out of
the maze of complicated legal questions in this area of the law.
B. REINTERPRETATION OF OLD STATUTES AND ENACTMENT OF
NEW ONES
The modern era in the law of employee privacy ushered in
more expansive interpretations of common-law notions of
privacy, as the cases discussed in the preceding section
illustrate. Expansion of rights under the common law is not the
only path by which the law in this area is evolving, though.

318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 768 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 768–69.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Statutes applicable to workplace technologies are also
supplying greater privacy protection. While courts afford
broader or otherwise more protective interpretations to the
antiquated statutes that have been on the books for some
period of time, legislative bodies at both the state and federal
level are also responding to the evolution of workplace
technologies and social norms. This section addresses both
avenues of expansion, discussing representative cases
according more protective interpretations to pre-existing
statutes as well as statutory reform efforts.
1. Modernized Interpretation of Antiquated Statutes
It is beyond objection that the existing statutory
framework relevant to employee privacy in workplace
technologies is highly antiquated and ill-suited to answer the
legal questions that arise in the modern era.322 Indeed, the only
relevant federal statutes, enacted in 1986, are approaching
thirty years old and pre-date the advent of the Internet and
World Wide Web.323 Those statutes, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)324 and Stored
Communications Act (SCA),325 originally afforded little to no
protection for employees seeking a privacy refuge, as discussed
in much more detail in Part I of this Article.326 That is, the
ECPA was interpreted to protect only against interception of
communications contemporaneous with transmission.327 As
such, it typically had no application with respect to e-mail
communications, which are nearly always accessed only after
delivery to the intended recipient’s account.328 The SCA, as its
name connotes, does afford protection to electronic
communications after they are in storage.329 However, the

322. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2002) (stating that the “existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address
modern forms of communication”).
323. Id.
324. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
(2012); see supra Part I.B.2 (discussing origin of ECPA and SCA).
325. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012); see supra
Part I.B.2 (discussing origin of ECPA and SCA).
326. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing cases interpreting ECPA and SCA in
context of modernizing workplace technologies).
327. Konop, 302 F.3d at 876–77; Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1994).
328. Konop, 302 F.3d at 876–78; Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463.
329. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701.

2014]

EMPLOYEE PRIVACY IN THE TECH ERA

1007

statute also contains sufficient exceptions such that employers
can nearly always mount a ready defense to any employee’s
claim of its violation, either as the provider of the business’s
network services, or on grounds an employee user has in one
fashion or another provided requisite statutory authorization to
permit the employer access.330
The constrained interpretations that bound the first courts
attempting to apply these antiquated statutes to modern
technologies seem to be giving way to more protective
interpretations in recent years. Thus, although the statutes
remain outdated and cry out for revision, some courts have
more recently found ways to afford greater protection to
employees, even within the antiquated structure. An example
of this phenomenon is Steinbach v. Village of Forest Park.331
Plaintiff Steinbach was Commissioner of the Village of Forest
Park, Illinois, an elected position.332 When she then ran against
the incumbent Mayor, she discovered that someone had
accessed her Forest Park e-mail account and forwarded to the
incumbent Mayor eleven e-mail messages she had received
from her constituents.333 Upon making this discovery, she sued
the Village, its Mayor, and its IT employee, alleging various
privacy-based claims.334 The defendants responded with a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), but unlike the predecessor courts of the earlier era,
the Steinbach court accorded the privacy claims a warmer
reception.335 Most relevant here is the court’s interpretation of
the relevant statutes. Although the court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim that the plaintiff
brought directly under the ECPA on grounds the Act did not
apply to municipalities,336 it relied on the Wiretap Act and SCA
to support the plaintiff’s common-law privacy claim.337
Specifically, the defendants contended that plaintiff could not
establish an “unauthorized” intrusion upon her seclusion
because the Village was exempt from liability under the statute
330. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114–15 (3d Cir.
2003); see also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing Fraser and the SCA).
331. Steinbach v. Vill. of Forest Park, No. 06 C 4215, 2009 WL 2605283
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009).
332. Id. at *1.
333. Id.
334. Id. at *1–2.
335. Id. at *2–7.
336. Id. at *2–3.
337. Id. at *4–5.
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as a “provider,” consistent with the first courts to interpret the
statute in the context of e-mail.338 The court, however, rejected
that argument, instead interpreting the statute more
forgivingly to the plaintiff’s interests.339 The court concluded
that the third party from whom Forest Park purchased internet
access—and not the city—was the “provider” under the statute,
thus negating the city’s exemption argument.340 This novel
interpretive approach facilitated success of plaintiff’s commonlaw privacy claim where the narrower interpretations of the
past would not. Moreover, because many, if not most,
employers must purchase their network access from some third
party, this line of reasoning has the potential to negate the
employer’s use of the “provider” exemption entirely.
Similarly, the court in Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant
Group also found a way around the statute via an employeefriendly interpretation.341 As discussed above, the plaintiffs in
Pietrylo sued their employer, the owner of the Houston’s
restaurant at which plaintiffs had worked; after they were
discharged due to what Houston’s deemed inappropriate
content on a Myspace.com page.342 Along with their commonlaw claims, discussed above, the plaintiffs also sued under the
federal SCA and its state counterpart.343 The defendantemployer was unable to take advantage of the “provider”
exemption discussed above since the website was created
remotely on the Myspace.com platform but argued against
liability instead on grounds that access was authorized by a
“user” of the service—a co-employee of the plaintiffs.344 That coemployee had in fact provided her login information to her
superiors,345 but, like in Steinbach, the court nevertheless
found a way around the statutory exemption. The fact that she
may have felt pressure from her supervisors to share her access
credentials in order to preserve her job created a fact question
338. Id. at *5; see supra Part I.B (discussing “early-era” interpretations of
ECPA and SCA, which typically afforded a defense to employers as providers
of network services).
339. Steinbach, 2009 WL 2605283, at *5.
340. Id.
341. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *3–
4 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008).
342. Id. at *1; see supra notes 248–66 and accompanying text (discussing
Pietrylo).
343. Pietrylo, 2008 WL 6085437, at *2.
344. Id. at *3.
345. Id. at *1.
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concerning the effectiveness of the authorization she allegedly
gave.346 Summary judgment was therefore denied, and the
statutory claim once again survived.347
2. Progressive Statutory Initiatives
While courts seem to be according more employee-friendly
interpretations to the antiquated federal statutory framework,
state legislatures are beginning to step into the fray as well by
enacting new statutes that protect the privacy rights of the
state’s workforce. Indeed, worker privacy is a hot topic in state
legislatures, as evidenced by the fact that thirty bills
addressing some aspect of worker privacy were enacted in 2012
alone, adding new protections in twenty states.348 The
pervasiveness of legislative reform in the area of workplace
privacy is further reflected by statistics showing that not only
are many states considering such laws, but for the last two
calendar years, state legislatures have enacted more laws
concerning worker privacy than any other labor-related
topic.349
A consistent theme in these state privacy enactments is
limiting employer access to employee and applicant socialmedia accounts.350 As social networking has become pervasive
in recent years, concerns about worker privacy are moving
beyond the classic e-mail-access scenario typified in the cases
discussed above. Traditional privacy protections generally were
not relevant to employee activity on social network sites, given
their public nature, but employees nevertheless came to expect
that their actions on social network sites were relevant only to
their private lives outside of work, and therefore had no
bearing on their jobs.351 When it became more commonplace for
346. Id. at *4.
347. Id. at *7.
348. John L. Fitzpatrick, Jr. & James L. Perine, State Labor Legislation
Enacted in 2012, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 2013, at 24, 29, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/02/art3full.pdf.
349. Id.; see also States Targeted Worker Privacy, Trafficking in Labor
Legislation Last Year, DOL Reports, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at A-7
(Mar. 5, 2013) (“For the second consecutive year, the most legislative activity
came in the worker privacy category, as 30 bills related to the subject were
passed in 20 states during 2012. The latest figure comes after legislators
enacted 31 privacy-related laws in 20 states a year earlier, as measured from
Oct. 1, 2010, to Dec. 31, 2011.”).
350. See infra notes 352–54 and accompanying text.
351. E.g., Cathleen O’Connor Schoultz, Workers, Employers See Privacy
Differently; Good Mobile, Media Policy Can Close Gap, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
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employers to request that employees and applicants turn over
their social network login credentials, state legislatures
responded by enacting laws prohibiting that practice. Maryland
was the first state to pass such a law, but numerous other
states have followed its lead.352 Indeed, according to the
National Conference of State Legislatures, six states enacted
such laws in 2012,353 ten more joined them in 2013, and such
legislation had been introduced or was pending in at least
thirty-six states by the end of the year.354 Based on these
statistics, it appears safe to say that such protections have
become the norm, and that nearly every state may eventually
grant them.
Some state legislatures have enacted other forms of
privacy protections directed toward workers. For example,
Connecticut and Delaware require that employers provide
written notice to employees before monitoring employee e-mail
or other Internet activities.355 Colorado and Tennessee protect
public employees’ privacy by requiring that government
entities adopt a written policy describing any electronic
monitoring that may occur.356 Thus, state legislatures are
protecting the privacy rights of workers in the technological era
with increasing frequency.
Federal law may not be far behind on the trajectory
established by the states. The Password Protection Act of 2013,
introduced in the House of Representatives on May 21, bears
some similarity to the now-pervasive state laws restricting
employer demands for social network passwords, but would

No. 56, at A-13 (Mar. 22, 2012) (“Employees tend to think they are in a private
zone, especially if they are using their own mobile communication
devices . . . .”).
352. Kathy Lundy Springuel, Maryland Is First State to Restrict Employer
Demands for Employee, Applicant Passwords, 85 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
85, at A-12 (May 2, 2012); see, e.g., Michael O. Loatman, Washington Becomes
Ninth State to Limit Employer Access to Social Media Accounts, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at A-7 (May 23, 2013).
353. Employer Access to Social Media Username and Passwords, 2012
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-socialmedia-passwords.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
354. Employer Access to Social Media Username and Passwords, supra
note 228.
355. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 705 (2005).
356. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204.5 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-512
(2012).
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reach even further by prohibiting employers from requesting a
password to any computer.357 A similar, narrower bill was
introduced in 2012.358 The Social Networking Online Protection
Act was nearly identical to the statutes recently enacted in
numerous states, and would have prohibited employers and
universities from mandating access to employee/student e-mail
accounts and social networking sites.359 Of course, it remains
unclear whether any such federal legislation will meet with
success, but the mere fact that such bills have been introduced
is itself indicative that legislative reform is possible. Likewise,
although lying just beyond the scope of this Article due to its
sweeping application beyond the workplace, it is nevertheless
worth noting here that Congress is also considering revisions to
the ECPA and SCA that would protect against warrantless email searches by government authorities, thereby providing
greater privacy protection to e-mail than the antiquated 1986
versions of the laws that currently remain in effect.360 Other
efforts to reform and update the “ancient” ECPA/SCA
framework have thus far failed, but the recent flurry of state
legislative activity in the electronic privacy arena suggests that

357. Password Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 2077, 113th Cong. (2013); Ilyse
W. Schuman, Federal Bill Would Institute Social Media Password Protection,
MONDAQ (June 6, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/243622/
employee+rights+labour+relations/Federal+Bill+Would+Institute+Social+Med
ia+Password+Protection (“Specifically, the bill would amend Section 1030 of
Title 18 of the U.S. Code . . . to make it unlawful if an employer: ‘for the
purposes of employing, promoting, or terminating employment, compels or
coerces any person to authorize access, such as by providing a password or
similar information through which a computer may be accessed, to a protected
computer that is not the employer’s protected computer, and thereby obtains
information from such protected computer.’”).
358. Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 5050, 112th Cong.
(2012).
359. Id. § 2(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any employer . . . to require or
request that an employee or applicant for employment provide the employer
with a user name, password, or any other means for accessing a private email
account of the employee or applicant or the personal account of the employee
or applicant on any social networking website . . . .”).
360. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, S.
607, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1847, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Ryan
Gallagher, Ancient Electronic Communications Law May Finally Be Updated
to Protect Email Privacy, SLATE (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:08 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/03/19/patrick_leahy_introduces_
legislation_to_update_ancient_electronic_communications.html.
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more sweeping changes at the federal level may be lurking just
around the corner.361
C. THE PRIVACY SPHERE CREATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS
Recent developments in the administrative-law arena also
deserve mention as consistent with the theme toward greater
recognition of employee rights in emerging technologies.
Similar to the state legislation discussed above, the focus here
lies in employee use of social media. As such, the issues that
arise in this context do not implicate privacy in the traditional
sense. But they are no less relevant as a result. The trends
here, consistent with the judicial decisions, statutes, and
legislation discussed above, reflect a theme favoring expansion
of employee rights in modern technological platforms. The law
implicated is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the
protections it affords to employees who engage in “concerted
activity”—i.e., group efforts to question or contest the terms
and conditions of employment.362 Social media presents
opportunities for engaging in concerted activity that did not
previously exist. These new forums give rise to novel legal
issues, as employers attempt to discern the extent to which
they can regulate employee conduct that may not occur in the
physical workplace but nevertheless directly affects it. To that
end, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is fighting
this battle on two related yet distinct frontiers—by challenging
the propriety of disciplinary action taken against employees for
their communications in social media settings, and by policing
361. Gallagher, supra note 360. Also consistent with the idea that
Congress may be headed toward enactment of greater privacy protections for
employees is a recent request by Republican lawmakers for a survey of e-mail
monitoring policies applicable to federal workers. See Louis C. LaBrecque,
Republican Lawmakers Ask OMB for Survey of Federal Worker E-mail
Monitoring Policies, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at A-3 (Mar. 6, 2012).
362. See Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B No. 37, at 2 (2012)
(“The Board first defined concerted activity in Meyers I as that which is
‘engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and
on behalf of the employee himself.’ 268 NLRB at 497. In Meyers II, the Board
expanded this definition to include those ‘circumstances where individual
employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well
as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of
management.’”). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . . .”).
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the content of employer policies that might be construed as
regulating such communications.363 The NLRB has decided one
representative case in each of these categories; together, they
paint a clear picture of the state of the law in this arena.
The NLRB’s decision in Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.
perfectly illustrates the hazards of taking disciplinary action
against employees who communicate with each other about
their jobs in a social media setting.364 Hispanics United
employee Mariana Cole-Rivera posted to her Facebook page,
during non-working hours: “Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels that
we don’t help our clients enough at [work]. I about had it! My
fellow coworkers how do u feel?”365 Four other employees, none
of whom were working at the time, responded, each generally
objecting to the suggestion that they were not doing a good
job.366 When the Executive Director of the organization learned
about these Facebook postings, she terminated their
employment.367
One of the discharged employees filed a charge under the
NLRA, contending that the termination of his employment
constituted an unfair labor practice.368 The General Counsel
then issued a complaint, alleging that the employees’
termination violated the NLRA’s prohibition against
discouraging concerted activities.369 The administrative law

363. See, e.g., Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (evaluating unfair
labor practice charge alleging that employer improperly discharged four
employees who objected, via Facebook comments, to a suggestion that their
supervisor found their work to be substandard); Costco Wholesale Corp., 358
N.L.R.B. No. 106, at 1 (2012) (affirming finding of administrative law judge
(ALJ) that employer’s written policy prohibiting electronic communications
that “damage the company” unlawfully inhibits protected concerted activity);
see also Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 1 (2012) (affirming
finding of ALJ that employer’s “courtesy” rule, prohibiting disrespectful
conduct and “language which injures the image or reputation of the
Dealership,” unlawfully prohibits protected concerted activity).
364. See Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37.
365. Id. at 2.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 6; see also id. at 8 (“Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair
labor practice to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7. Section 7 provides that, ‘employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . . .’”).
369. Id.
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judge (ALJ) upheld the charge, concluding that the employees
were discharged unlawfully for engaging in protected concerted
activity:
Employees have a protected right to discuss matters affecting their
employment amongst themselves. Explicit or implicit criticism by a
coworker of the manner in which they are performing their jobs is
a subject about which employee discussion is protected by Section
7. That is particularly true in this case, where at least some of the
discriminatees had an expectation that Lydia Cruz-Moore might
take her criticisms to management. By terminating the five
discriminatees for discussing Cruz-Moore’s criticisms of HUB
employees’ work, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).370

On review, the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings.371 Like
the ALJ, the Board found no reason to depart from otherwiseapplicable precedents solely on the basis that the mode of
communication—Facebook—was novel.372 Finding that the
employees’ comments were protected concerted activity, the
Board therefore upheld the ALJ’s conclusion that their
discharge was unlawful.373
An employer’s knee-jerk response to the Hispanics United
decision might be to publish a policy broadly prohibiting
negative comments about the employer on social media, in
order to avoid the scenario that ultimately transpired in that
case. Such an approach would not be advisable, however, in
light of the other frontier on which the NLRB is attacking
employer regulation of employee social-media use. In Costco
Wholesale Corp.,374 the other seminal NLRB decision
addressing social media in 2012, the Board concluded that an
employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA when it
published and enforced a policy prohibiting electronic
communications “that damage the Company, defame any
individual or damage any person’s reputation, or violate the
policies outlined in the [company’s employee agreement].”375
Rejecting the ALJ’s contrary finding, the Board found that
“employees would reasonably conclude that the rule requires
them to refrain from engaging in certain protected
370. Id. at 9.
371. Id. at 1.
372. Id. (“Although the employees’ mode of communicating their workplace
concerns might be novel, we agree with the judge that the appropriate
analytical framework for resolving their discharge allegations has long been
settled . . . .”).
373. Id.
374. Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (2012).
375. Id. at 1.
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communications.”376 In other words, because the policy might
chill employee speech falling within the protections of the Act
as concerted activity, the policy was itself unlawful. As such,
not only must employers guard against disciplining employees
who use social media to communicate with coworkers about the
terms and conditions of their employment, but they also must
ensure that such communications are neither prohibited nor
discouraged. The result is that employers are limited in their
ability to regulate employee use of social media, thereby at
least suggesting that employees retain some notion of privacy
in their use of social media during non-working hours, even
when such use pertains directly to their job.
III. JUXTAPOSING THE TRENDS AND HYPOTHESIZING
FROM THEIR TRAJECTORY
There can be no doubt that the law of employee privacy in
workplace technologies is shifting as social norms evolve. The
first courts to confront issues of employee privacy in emerging
technologies evinced grave trepidation about creating any new
rights, clinging firmly to rudimentary conceptions about how
such technologies worked.377 As the first decade of the new
millennium drew to a close, though, the tide appeared to
turn.378 Courts no longer expressed such disdain for claims of
privacy in workplace technologies, instead opening wider the
court house doors, inviting more plaintiffs in.379 All this
transpired in spite of the early-era precedents to the contrary,
and often in the face of employer policies attempting to take the
wind out of such claims’ sails even before they could take flight.
As technology use became increasingly pervasive, social norms
shifted to reflect that change.
The preceding detailed exposition of the cases that typified
the “early” and “modern” eras of technology-based employee
privacy reveals in lucidity the unmistakable shift in the legal
response to such claims. In case of any lingering doubt, though,
a few direct comparisons should quiet any naysayers. And,
while the trends of the past and present might inform us about
how far we have come, they do not obviate the path of the
future. This Part endeavors, therefore, to solidify the stark
376. Id. at 2.
377. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing trepidation of early-era courts).
378. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing a trend toward greater recognition of
employee rights in the modern era).
379. See supra Part II.A.1.
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contrast of the trends established in Parts I and II by directly
juxtaposing certain early cases against comparable modern
ones. It then proceeds to draw conclusions about what all of
this means for what is otherwise a most assuredly uncertain
future.
A. A COMPARATIVE JUXTAPOSITION
Juxtaposition of the trends identified in the preceding
Parts of this Article reveals in stark fashion a shift from
reluctance to acceptance in the law of employee privacy rights.
When technologies were new, courts were extraordinarily
reticent to carve out or establish employee rights. But as
technologies have undergone rapid expansion and growth and
their usage has become more commonplace, so that even the
very judges and legislators leading the law’s development are
using these technologies on a daily basis, the reality of the
shifting social norms can no longer be ignored. A few direct
comparisons best illustrate this point.
The first illustrative example juxtaposes the earliest
published case addressing employee privacy rights in e-mail
against one of the starters of the modern revolution. Recall
Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,380 and Pure Power Boot Camp v.
Warrior Fitness Boot Camp.381 Both cases addressed the
privacy rights of employees in e-mail, and in both cases, the
employer either made assurances or published a policy
purporting to establish (or defeat, as the case may be) those
rights.382 The contrast between the employers’ approaches is
alone striking, but the juxtaposition becomes even more glaring
in light of the decisions the courts made about the employees’
privacy. In Smyth, the employer repeatedly assured its
employees that all e-mail communications were confidential
and that they “could not be intercepted and used by [the
employer] against its employees as grounds for termination or
reprimand.”383 Notwithstanding these assurances, the court
concluded that employees could not and should not expect any

380. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see supra
notes 45–82 and accompanying text (discussing Smyth).
381. Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp.
2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see supra notes 230–47 and accompanying text
(discussing Pure Power Boot Camp).
382. Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 552–53; Smyth, 914 F.
Supp. at 98–100.
383. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98.
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privacy in their e-mail communications.384 Indeed, the court
reached this conclusion with very little analysis, finding “no
privacy interests in such communications.”385
Pure Power Boot Camp, decided twelve years later, stands
in stark contrast. The employer there took the opposite
approach, expressly and directly negating any expectations of
privacy in employees’ computer communications via a policy
published in the Employee Handbook: “[E]-mail users have no
right of personal privacy in any matter stored in, created on,
received from, or sent through or over the system. This includes
the use of personal e-mail accounts on Company equipment.”386
Notwithstanding that policy, however, the court concluded that
the employees in that case could expect privacy in the e-mail
messages they sent on their personal web-based e-mail
accounts, even though they had not only accessed those
accounts from company equipment but had also stored their
login credentials there, permitting ready access by anyone who
could get to the computer.387
The contrast between these two cases boldly exemplifies
the shift that has occurred from the early era of workplace
privacy in emerging technologies, to the modern era of
pervasive and highly developed technology use. The Smyth
court, refusing even to engage a discussion about what the
employee legitimately or reasonably might have expected in
using his company e-mail, leaped quickly to the conclusion that
no privacy interests existed, despite the employer’s assurances
to the contrary.388 The court’s approach evinces great
trepidation at the idea of establishing privacy rights, and
perhaps that reluctance is attributable, at least in part, to the
relative novelty of the e-mail medium at that time. In 1996, email had just begun to be a pervasive mode of communication
in American workplaces.389 The judge who decided the Smyth

384. Id. at 101.
385. Id.
386. Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (emphasis omitted).
387. Id. at 561 (“There is no sound basis to argue that [employee], by
inadvertently leaving his Hotmail password accessible, was thereby
authorizing access to all of his Hotmail e-mails, no less the e-mails in his two
other accounts.”).
388. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.
389. See Rob Spiegel, When Did the Internet Become Mainstream?,
TIMES
(Nov.
12,
1999,
12:00
AM),
http://
E-COMMERCE
www.ecommercetimes.com/story/1731.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2013)
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case may well have had little or no experience with it himself.
That inexperience, in turn, could have contributed to his swift
conclusion that it is unreasonable to expect privacy in e-mail—
a conclusion that is all the more remarkable given that the
employer had, at least as alleged by the plaintiff, “repeatedly
assured its employees, including plaintiff, that all e-mail
communications would remain confidential and privileged.”390
The evolution of social norms in the face of rapidly
expanding use of technology in the workplace over the twelve
years that intervened between Smyth and Pure Power Boot
Camp may well explain the polar opposite result reached in the
later case. Quite unlike Pillsbury, the employer in Pure Power
Boot Camp expressly and unequivocally declared in a published
handbook policy that employees should not expect privacy in
their computer communications and activities.391 Yet, the court
still found that the employee’s privacy expectations were
reasonable.392 The fact that the employee sent the subject email over his personal, web-based e-mail account, as opposed to
the e-mail account provided by his employer, may have made a
difference in this aspect of the court’s determination. However,
the employee also saved his login credentials on his company
computer, effectively leaving the key in the door and
facilitating ready access to his otherwise-personal account.393
Even so, the court still found that the employee could expect
privacy.394 Shifting social norms may explain this result. By
2008, e-mail use had become much more pervasive, and it was
not uncommon for employees to use it frequently for both
professional and personal purposes.395 Social norms had
shifted, and the courts seemed to be tracking those changes.
Other comparisons also illustrate the turn of the tide away
from the disdain expressed in the early era and toward the
acceptance of privacy rights in the modern era. The plaintiff in
McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., another early-era case, went so far
(“Twelve months ago, I never would have predicted that Internet usage would
become completely mainstream by November 1999.”).
390. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98.
391. Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
392. Id. at 560.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See generally Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 654
(N.J. 2010) (“In the past twenty years, businesses and private citizens alike
have embraced the use of computers, electronic communication devices, the
Internet, and e-mail.”).
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as to protect the “personal” e-mail folder on his work computer
with a password that only he knew on a system devised and
provided by his employer.396 McLaren argued that the law
should not treat his password-protected e-mail folder any
differently than it treated a locked locker in the pretechnological era.397 The court, however, cast aside the
password as essentially irrelevant, concluding instead that
because the e-mails were transmitted over the company
system, McLaren could expect no privacy in them, password or
not.398 The court’s decision reflects, therefore, a grave
reluctance to recognize any privacy rights in emerging
technologies.
The McLaren court’s reticence becomes clearer when
viewed in contrast to the somewhat comparable scenario in
Pure Power Boot Camp, which netted an opposite result. As
discussed above, the court in Pure Power Boot Camp found that
the employee could reasonably expect privacy in the e-mail
messages sent from, received on, and stored in his personal
web-based e-mail account, even though he had accessed that
account from his employer’s computer and had gone so far as to
save his login credentials there, providing ready access.399
Despite having readily enabled such access, the court still
concluded that the employee could reasonably expect privacy in
the account’s contents.400 This result therefore stands in stark
contrast to that of McLaren, in which the court swiftly rejected
the plaintiff’s privacy claims, even though he had protected his
e-mail with a password. In other words, the early-era employee
who password-protected his account could not expect privacy,
but the modern-era employee who enabled ready access by
saving his password on the computer could.
Yet another juxtaposition, comparing the courts’ reception
to traditional causes of action as vehicles for supporting novel
privacy rights, makes the point here even more emphatically.
As discussed in Part I above, many of the earliest plaintiffs to
pursue vindication of privacy rights in emerging workplace
technologies sought to establish claims under the existing

396. McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824, 1999 WL 339015, at *5
(Tex. App. May 28, 1999).
397. Id. at *4 (discussing K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.
1984)).
398. Id.
399. Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 559–60.
400. Id.
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common-law framework.401 Indeed, the plaintiffs in nearly
every seminal early-era case discussed in Part I sought relief at
least in part on a common-law tort theory like invasion of
privacy, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, or
both.402 Each and every such plaintiff failed in that endeavor,
with the overwhelming majority of the courts swiftly rejecting
their claims on grounds that no reasonable expectation of
privacy existed, thereby tolling the death knell of their
common-law claims, no matter what the underlying theory.403
In the modern era, by contrast, courts became increasingly
receptive to such claims. For example, the plaintiff’s claims in
Steinbach v. Village of Forest Park bore several striking
resemblances to the claims brought by the early-era
trailblazers.404 Like her predecessors, Steinbach sued for
invasion of privacy, asserting both common-law and statutory
theories.405 Unlike the prior courts, though, this one denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the law could
support Steinbach’s privacy claims on the facts she had
alleged.406 The wariness that led the early-era courts to dismiss
401. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the earliest cases in which plaintiffs
brought common-law privacy claims).
402. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 111, 116 (3d
Cir. 2003) (considering plaintiff’s claims for wrongful termination and
invasion of privacy); Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 0011243-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *1 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (discussing
plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97,
98 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy); Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. B068705 (Cal.
Ct. App. July 26, 1993), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke_
v_Nissan.html (addressing plaintiffs’ claims for common-law invasion of
privacy and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy); McLaren v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824, 1999 WL 339015, at *4–5 (Tex. App. May
28, 1999) (addressing plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claims). See generally
supra Part I.A (discussing cases cited hereinabove).
403. See Fraser, 352 F.3d at 111–13 (affirming summary judgment to
employer on plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim because no public policy was
implicated due to absence of protectable privacy right); Garrity, 2002 WL
974676, at *1–2 (dismissing invasion of privacy claim on grounds of no
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail); Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100–01
(granting motion to dismiss wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
claim upon finding employee could not reasonably expect privacy in e-mail);
Bourke, No. B068705 (concluding that plaintiffs lacked reasonable expectation
of privacy in e-mail and rejecting invasion of privacy and wrongful discharge
claims on that basis); McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *4 (same).
404. Steinbach v. Vill. of Forest Park, No. 06 C 4215, 2009 WL 2605283, at
*1–5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009).
405. Id. at *2.
406. Id. at *4.
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before the claims ever left the starting gates therefore gave way
to not just a willingness but indeed a genuine interest in
allowing the claims to proceed.
Similarly, the court in Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant
Group also accorded the plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy and
wrongful discharge claims a much warmer reception.407 Indeed,
the court in Pietrylo confronted essentially the same question
that led to the demise of most early-era claims—whether a
right to privacy could support a wrongful discharge claim as a
relevant source of public policy.408 Its answer, however, was
markedly different. The court stated quite plainly that “[a]
right to privacy may be a source of ‘a clear mandate of public
policy’ that could support a claim for wrongful termination.”409
Based on that conclusion, the court denied the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs
reasonably expected privacy in their invitation-only website,
and that a genuine fact issue existed concerning whether the
employee who granted management access did so
voluntarily.410
The change of course in modern-era treatment of commonlaw claims provides further support for the theory espoused
here, that shifting social norms have facilitated an evolution in
the law, as courts have accorded increasingly broader privacy
rights in workplace technologies. The role that social norms
play in this process, however, becomes more evident in light of
the express recognition by some courts of their significance. For
instance, in Pietrylo, not only did the court break new ground
in accepting a right to privacy as a sufficient source of public
policy, but the court also stated expressly that “expectations of
privacy are established by general social norms.”411 Similarly,
the court in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., on the way to
finding that the plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy in email communications with her lawyer through a personal webbased account accessed on company equipment, concluded that
social norms play a vital role in the establishment of the law in

407. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 WL 6085437, at *1
(D.N.J. July 25, 2008).
408. Id. at *6.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at *7 (quoting White v. White, 781 A.2d 85, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 2001)).
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this arena.412 To that end, the court began its opinion with an
expression about the impact of social norms on workplace
rights:
In the past twenty years, businesses and private citizens alike
have embraced the use of computers, electronic communication
devices, the Internet, and e-mail. As those and other forms of
technology evolve, the line separating business from personal
activities can easily blur.
In the modern workplace, for example, occasional, personal
use of the Internet is commonplace. Yet that simple act can raise
complex issues about an employer’s monitoring of the workplace
and an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.413

Those evolving social norms then proved integral in the court’s
conclusion that the plaintiff’s privacy expectations were
reasonable, notwithstanding an employer policy attempting to
defeat any such expectancy.414
The Supreme Court’s most recent instruction about
workplace privacy in modern technologies, notwithstanding its
failure to answer open questions about the governing law, also
illustrates that social norms play a vital role in the shaping of
that law.415 Indeed, the majority touted the evolution of social
norms, and the speed with which the evolution proceeds, as the
primary justification for its refusal to reach any firm
conclusions about the law governing employees’ privacy
expectations:
The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole
concept of privacy expectations in communications made on
electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The
judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in
society has become clear . . . . Prudence counsels caution before the
facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises
that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations
enjoyed
by
employees
when
using
employer-provided
communication devices.
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and
information transmission are evident not just in the technology
itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.416

412.
2010).
413.
414.
415.
416.

See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 654 (N.J.
Id. at 654–55.
See id.
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 758–61 (2010).
Id. at 759.
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It was this very reluctance to make any firm declarations
about the law of workplace privacy expectations that elicited a
scathing response from Justice Scalia in his concurrence:
Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may
sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we
have no choice. The Court’s implication that where electronic
privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise
would . . . ––or that we should hedge our bets by concocting casespecific standards or issuing opaque opinions—is in my view
indefensible.417

And thus Justice Scalia returns us to the point at which this
Article began, with a reference to the prophetic lyrics of Bob
Dylan: “The-times-they-are-a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for
disregard of duty.”418
B. THE TRAJECTORY OF THE FUTURE
Having firmly established that shifting social norms are
turning tides in the law of employee privacy, the question
remains: What next? Indubitably, new technological frontiers
that we cannot yet fathom will raise novel issues repeatedly in
the years to come. Some of these frontiers have already been
discovered but remain relatively unexplored. Examples include
online social media, and the use of GPS devices to track
employee whereabouts and habits.419 How the law should
respond to these burgeoning frontiers remains in some doubt,
but the recent evolution in the law suggests at least two
possible approaches. Because this Article takes a comparativeretrospective approach, exposing the shift in trends that has
occurred over the past quarter century, a full exposition and
hypothesis on how the law should ultimately resolve this
quandary in the future is beyond its scope. Nevertheless, some
excursus on the prospects is appropriate.
The first possible approach is that espoused by the
majority of the Supreme Court in City of Ontario v. Quon.420
417. Id. at 768–79 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
418. Id. at 768.
419. See generally Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d
468, 473–74 (N.Y. 2013) (holding that GPS tracking of state employee’s car did
not require a search warrant under what the court termed the “workplace
exception,” but finding the search unreasonable due to continuation during
non-working hours); Joyce E. Cutler, Companies Should Inform Workers of
Risks with Social Media, LinkedIn Counsel Advises, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 135, at A-9 (July 15, 2013) (discussing rising prominence of social media
use in workplace).
420. Quon, 560 U.S. at 758–61.
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Much akin to the early-era courts, the majority in Quon
evinced reluctance and grave trepidation about charting any
new course in the law of workplace privacy given the rapid
maturation of relevant social norms.421 Having gone to great
pains to avoid broaching that subject, though, the Court has in
effect declared a piecemeal approach.422 Without direct
instruction from the Supreme Court, litigants and judges are
left to determine, based on the scattered precedents, what the
law should be and how it should (or should not, as the case may
be) respond to social change. This approach has the appeal of
malleability, permitting the development of the law to track
society’s progression. But it is not without its shortcomings,
chief among which are ambiguity and lack of predictability.
The alternative approach might avoid some of these
pitfalls, but is also not without imperfections. Justice Scalia,
dating back to the Court’s early forays into the law of
workplace privacy, well before the advent of modern
technology, has long espoused the view that subjectivity in this
arena is undesirable.423 According to Justice Scalia, subjectivity
only breeds ambiguity.424 The law should therefore assume
categorically, he suggests, that privacy interests exist,
obviating the need for inquiry into subjective expectations.425
The inquiry therefore need only focus on whether the subject
search was itself reasonable.426 The appeal of Justice Scalia’s
categorical approach lies in its relative simplicity. Quite
obviously, a standard that resolves upon only a single inquiry
is simpler than a two-step analysis. It is that very

421. Id.
422. Id.; see id. at 768 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Despite the Court’s
insistence that it is agnostic about the proper test, lower courts will likely read
the Court’s self-described ‘instructive’ expatiation on how the O’Connor
plurality’s approach would apply here (if it applied), as a heavy-handed hint
about how they should proceed.” (citation omitted)).
423. Id. at 767–68 (discussing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717
(1987)).
424. Id.; see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Even if
I did not disagree with the plurality as to what result the proper legal
standard should produce in the case before us, I would object to the
formulation of a standard so devoid of content that it produces rather than
eliminates uncertainty in this field.”).
425. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 730–32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
426. Id.; see also Quon, 560 U.S. at 767 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I continue
to believe that the ‘operational realities’ rubric for determining the Fourth
Amendment’s application to public employees invented by the plurality in
O’Connor v. Ortega is standardless and unsupported.” (citation omitted)).
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simplification, however, that casts some doubt upon its efficacy
and appropriateness. If the detailed exposition in Parts I and II
above reveals nothing else, it shows that nothing is static in the
law of workplace privacy. Given the continuing rapid expansion
of technology and its direct impact on the workplace, it may be
naive, if not improper, to make the kind of assumptions that
Justice Scalia’s categorical approach requires. And whatever
the benefits and shortcomings of these alternate approaches
may be, it remains clear that no obvious solution has emerged.
The law continues to evolve along with the social norms,
though, and perhaps that perfect answer lies just around the
next bend.
CONCLUSION
No one can deny that when it comes to the law of employee
privacy in workplace technologies, the times they are achangin’. In the early era of technology in the workplace, courts
demonstrated great reluctance to carve out any ambit of
protection. Almost without exception, the early courts
concluded summarily that employees had no right of privacy
whatsoever in electronic communications. The common law
therefore afforded no relief to aggrieved employees, and the
antiquated statutes that purport to govern such issues offered
little respite as well.
Over the course of the last decade, though, social norms
have begun to shift as the use of technology has become
increasingly pervasive both in the workplace and beyond. The
law may not have kept pace, but it is certainly evolving.
Although the antiquated statutes remain a sole source of
protection at the federal-law level, states are responding by
recognizing common-law protections for privacy rights that did
not previously exist and enacting new legislation addressed to
specific privacy concerns. Thus, as society itself becomes more
immersed in modern modes of communication, the law is
beginning to recognize that traditional notions of privacy may
no longer apply. The trajectory of the future is uncertain, but if
any lesson can be gleaned from the experience of the last
quarter century, it is that when it comes to privacy interests in
constantly-changing workplace technologies, the law must
either begin to anticipate changes or remain flexible to respond
rapidly. The course of the future is yet unknown, but it is
certain that it includes progress that the law must address.

***

